



Israeli F-35I beside 4 MK-84
manufactured in the McAlester Army
Ammunition Plant (MCAAP).

EXPOSING THE U.S. LOOPHOLE: HOW CANADIAN F-35 PARTS AND EXPLOSIVES REACH ISRAEL

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Executive Summary

For the first time, this report exposes a pipeline of military goods flowing from Canada to Israel via the U.S., facilitated by a deadly loophole in Canadian law. The hundreds of documented shipments of explosives and aircraft parts – from Canadian factories and through Canadian ports – contain vital components of both Israel’s F-35 fighter jets and the bombs they are dropping on Gaza.

Despite the recent purported ‘ceasefire,’ the bombs have not stopped falling – Israel has continued its relentless bombardment and occupation of Gaza and ongoing campaign of assassinations, arrests, and displacements of Palestinians in the West Bank.

Canada has long downplayed its role in arming Israel, claiming it only issues a limited number of export permits – permits the government now says it has suspended. But this report exposes a far deeper complicity: Canada is a critical enabler of the United States’ billions of dollars in military aid and sales to Israel annually.

The evidence below details hundreds of shipments from Canadian military manufacturers to the U.S. weapons factories that manufacture Israel’s key warplanes, bombs, and artillery shells. The report also exposes – for the first time – Canada’s role as a vital transit corridor for hundreds of shipments of European-made TNT en route to U.S. bomb-makers, and damning evidence of Canadian F-35 components being shipped on to Israel mere days after arriving at U.S. facilities.

Using commercially available export data and U.S. Department of Defense contracts, this report provides a snapshot into both Canadian weapons production and Canada’s role as a critical weapons transit corridor to the U.S. and on to Israel:

- **34 shipments of military aircraft components** sent by American Lockheed factories to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the Israeli Air Force Base, and Israeli weapons manufacturers between April 2024 and August 2025 – *immediately after receiving hundreds of matching shipments from Canadian manufacturers.*
- **360 additional aircraft part shipments** from Canadian manufacturers to Lockheed Martin’s F-35 assembly facility in Fort Worth, Texas, between September 29, 2023 and August 5, 2025, representing only a fraction of the millions of dollars of Canadian-made components in every F-35 jet that Israel has been using to bombard Gaza.
- **150 shipments of Canadian explosives and flammable materials** from General Dynamics facilities in Valleyfield and Repentigny, Quebec, to the U.S. Army Ammunition Plants that manufacture 2000-pound MK-84 bombs, 155mm artillery shells, and 120mm tank rounds for export to Israel. The Valleyfield plant is the sole North American supplier of M31A2 triple-base propellant and is currently fulfilling a contract to produce this propellant for the U.S. to supply its allies, including Israel. This propellant is used to fire the hundreds of thousands of 155mm artillery shells that Israel has deployed in its assault on Gaza.

- **433 shipments of TNT** manufactured in Poland and routed through the Port Saguenay, Quebec, between October 2023 and November 2025. Shipments were then transported by truck on Canadian and American highways to U.S. Army Ammunition Plants, which use the TNT to produce the 2000-pound MK-84 and I-2000 Penetrator bombs that Israel drops on Gaza.

The shipments documented in this report represent merely a fraction of Canada's true complicity in arming Israel via the United States. A regulatory loophole exempts most U.S.-bound military goods from requiring permits, meaning that the vast majority of this weapons pipeline operates in a deliberate blackhole – hidden from public scrutiny, government tracking, and human rights assessments.

Since October 2023, Canadian officials have attempted to pacify public outrage by misrepresenting the nature of the Canada-Israel arms trade. Former Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly promised Canada would "not have any form of arms or parts of arms be sent to Gaza, period," including through indirect pathways. Current Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand insists the government would "not allow Canadian-made weapons to fuel this conflict in any way."

This report proves – again – that the government is lying. The government took no action to close the U.S. Loophole or restrict Canada's role as a vital corridor for foreign explosives. By deliberately exempting U.S.-bound arms from export regulation and allowing Canadian infrastructure to transport weapons, Canada is circumventing its obligations under international law.

The evidence is unequivocal: Canada remains an active participant in genocide both through manufacturing weapons and serving as a weapons transit corridor. To end this complicity Canada must enact sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act to cut off the flow of weapons to and from Israel, and amend Canada's arms control legislation to close the loopholes in Canada's arms exports. The government must impose a full and comprehensive two-way arms embargo on Israel.

Introduction

The flow of military goods from Canada to Israel is facilitated by two distinct export channels, each containing a multitude of individual trade routes. The July 2025 report, “Exposing Canadian Military Shipments to Israel,” documented direct transfers of Canadian-made weapons to Israel.¹ This new report shifts focus to the second channel, the transfer of weapons from Canada to Israel by way of the United States. The existence of this indirect route represents not only a critical failure in Canada’s arms control regime but an intentional method for circumventing Canada’s commitment to the Arms Trade Treaty in favour of profiteering from war crimes.

This indirect trade route is made possible by a significant legal loophole in Canada’s *Export and Import Permit Act* (EIPA) and regulations. Under EIPA’s current provisions, most military goods shipped to the U.S. are exempt from the typical arms export permitting process. This means that they do not require a permit issued by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and so are neither tracked nor regulated by the department. **This regulatory exemption allows more than 1 billion dollars worth of Canadian-produced components to be integrated into the U.S. military supply chain every year, without oversight or transparency, thereby circumventing Canada’s legal obligations for human rights due diligence.**² Through this loophole, Canada escapes public and parliamentary scrutiny for a significant portion of its weapons exports.

Once these arms enter the U.S., GAC no longer tracks them. The Canadian government thus distances itself from the final use of these exports, and absolves itself from responsibility for any subsequent human rights violations perpetrated using those military goods. This amounts to a strategy of purposeful negligence to avoid both the legal responsibility and the economic cost of properly regulating Canadian weapons exports. However, for the first time since Israel’s genocide began, and despite the U.S. Loophole that means shipments to the United States are unpermitted and untracked by GAC, **this report has managed to trace a flow of military goods from Canada to Israel, demonstrating that it is possible to track such shipments. The Canadian Government, in particular GAC, is choosing not to.**

The following report will expose two distinct ways that the U.S. Loophole is being used to arm Israel, with records from October 2023 through October 2025. The first part of the report will expose the ongoing Canadian supply of military aircraft parts, mainly for Israel’s F-35s. It will track shipments of components going to American Lockheed Martin plants and then being forwarded on to Israeli military bases and factories, as well as shipments that are integrated into warplanes on Lockheed’s Fort Worth assembly line. The second part of the report will reveal ongoing shipments of explosive materials to U.S. munitions factories – some of which are produced in Canada and others which transit through Canada via Port Saguenay in Quebec – that are manufactured into bombs and artillery used by the Israeli military.

¹ [Exposing Canadian Military Exports to Israel](#), Arms Embargo Now, Palestinian Youth Movement, and World Beyond War, 29 July 2025.

² [Remarks to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade on Bill C-47](#), CADSI, 28 November 2018.

Part 1: Shipments of Canadian-Made Fighter Jet Components to Israel through the U.S.

There are millions of dollars of Canadian-made components in every F-35 jet that Israel has been using to bomb Gaza. Not only does Canada supply Lockheed Martin's Texas factory with key parts for manufacturing these warplanes, but new data revealed in this report uncovered dozens of shipments of F-35 components being transported from Canada to the U.S., and then, a few days later, on to Israel.

The F-35 has been one of Israel's key tools of destruction, responsible for dropping 2000lb bombs on refugee camps and apartment buildings. Despite Canada's claims that it stopped sending weapons to Israel, the ongoing shipments of F-35 components, to the U.S. factories producing Israel's warplanes and to Israel through the U.S., demonstrate how the U.S. Loophole has enabled an uninterrupted flow of Canadian military parts to Israel's genocide.

The F-35 Lightning II, a stealth fighter jet central to Israeli military operations, has become a primary instrument of the genocide in Gaza.³ As a partner in the F-35 program, the Canadian military industry is deeply embedded in Lockheed Martin's supply chain, with every F-35 jet containing over \$2.3 million USD worth of Canadian-made parts according to the company's documents.⁴ This contribution is part of a broader pattern of interlocking military production, with Canadian parts also being incorporated into systems like the Apache helicopter and other military aircrafts used by Israel.

Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth, Texas facility is the largest assembly and maintenance site for the F-35 fighter jet.⁵ At this facility, the production of F-35 aircraft occurs in large batches called "lots," each comprising hundreds of units designated for various recipients.⁶ While the U.S. government does not publicly report prime contract awards by these lot numbers, an analysis of the award descriptions and corresponding subcontracts often reveals the extent of Canadian participation. By identifying the lots containing aircraft supplied to Israel, along with the Canadian manufacturers involved through their subcontracts, **it is possible to map out the Canadian companies supplying Lockheed Martin's assembly of F-35s destined for Israel.** In addition, evidence from a report by Project Ploughshares, which utilizes U.S. Department of Defense contract data, establishes a direct link between Canadian-sourced components, and the F-35s delivered to Israel.⁷ An analysis of contracts confirms that Canadian-based companies contributed parts to all lots under which F-35s were or are to be produced for the Israeli Air Force

³ [What is the F-35 fighter jet Israel uses to bomb Gaza and Iran?](#), Declassified UK, 18 June 2025.

⁴ [Industrial and Regional Benefits: Economic Impact of Canada's Participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program](#), Lockheed Martin, 7 June 2024.

⁵ [Inside the mile-long factory line where America's F-35 stealth fighter jets are made](#), Business Insider, 19 February 2025.

⁶ [Global Production of the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter](#), Ploughshares, January 2025.

⁷ [Global Production of the Israeli F-35I Joint Strike Fighter](#), Ploughshares, January 2025.

(LOT 8, LOT 9, LOT 10, LOT 11, LOT 12-14, LOT 15-17, and recently LOT 18).⁸ As of November 2025, Israel has received 45 F-35I aircraft, and is expected to receive another 30 by 2030.⁹

As a partner nation in the F-35 program, Canada is home to numerous aerospace and defence firms which manufacture essential components for the fighter jet. **Canadian-made F-35 components shipped to the U.S. make it to Israel in two ways: components are either immediately passed on to defence manufacturers or airforce facilities in Israel, or they are incorporated into F-35s in Texas and then sent to Israel.** The shipments uncovered in this report represent a small fraction of Canada's contribution to both pathways.

Tracking Canadian Shipments to U.S. Factories and on to Israel

The following analysis of commercially available shipping data from April 2024 to August 2025 identified 34 shipments to the U.S. that appear to have been immediately re-routed on to Israel. These parts originated from four different companies: Honeywell (Mississauga, ON), Heroux Devtek (Laval, QC), Magellan Aerospace (Kitchener, ON), and Cyclone Manufacturing (Mississauga, ON), supplying the Israeli military while it perpetuated genocide in Gaza. The following tables also link these 34 shipments to Israel to 611 shipments from the Canadian factories to Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S. that appear to describe related parts.

Canadian-made weapon components were primarily transported via air freight, with the vast majority of shipments departing from Toronto Pearson (457) and Montreal-Trudeau (154) international airports.¹⁰ These F-35 components were shipped as cargo aboard American Airlines commercial passenger flights from Toronto, and by FedEx from Montreal. Each airport operates as a hub in the military supply chain, with Canadian highways and rail systems transporting components to these critical departure points.

The goods listed in the following tables are components of aircrafts, most of which are often shipped with the label "subject to ITAR": subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. This designation reflects that the shipments are not just generic aircraft parts but are **essential components that enable the advanced stealth, avionics, and survivability of military aircrafts.**

This section includes data related to shipments of four categories of aircraft components, mainly related to the F-35, from four Canadian arms factories to U.S. Lockheed Martin factories. Due to a lack of structural transparency, establishing specific definitive links regarding the Canadian supply chain is a complex undertaking. It is difficult to definitively substantiate the claim that *every specific component* cited in this report has ultimately been transferred to the Israeli military. **However, for each category detailed below, the logistical data is presented in a table where cargo being manufactured at a specific facility in Canada and shipped to a particular Lockheed Martin assembly facility are followed by shipments of cargo with identical or similar shipping labels travelling from that same assembly facility to defence**

⁸ [N0001923C0003](#), HigherGov, (as of November 2025).

⁹ [Israel receives 3 more F-35 fighter jets, boosting fleet to 45](#), Middle East Monitor, 25 April 2025.

¹⁰ These shipments do not account for layovers. Therefore, there are more flights than what is mentioned here.

manufacturers or military bases in Israel a couple of days later.

Contracts between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Lockheed Martin Corporation for the manufacturing of warplanes are also included to support the data. As the prime and often sole awardee for these fighter jets, Lockheed Martin relies on a network of subcontractors to facilitate production. In doing so, Lockheed Martin, as the “prime awardee”, subcontracts other companies as an “awardee” for specific subawards contracts. The contracts included below further confirm the complicity of Canadian-based companies as “awardees” in the F-35 supply chain, directly tying them to the manufacturing of warplanes deployed in Gaza. Some of these Canadian companies are even “sole-suppliers”, which means that their components are incorporated into every F-35, including the Israeli version of the jet, **directly linking them to the genocide.**

While the end use of these particular shipments of F-35 parts cannot be confirmed, it is worth noting that modern fighter jets like F-35s require extensive maintenance to remain functional.¹¹ Major General Donald Carpenter, the F-35 Program’s head of logistics and sustainment, confirmed in April 2024 that Israel’s fleet was being supported by shipments of replacement parts from partner nations.¹² Canadian companies are woven into this global supply chain – keeping these deadly warplanes flying above Gaza despite the government’s sweeping statements to the contrary.

Lockheed Martin Facilities Involved in the Supply-Chain of Military Aircraft

The tracked shipments of Canadian military aircraft components between April 2024 and August 2025 go to one of four U.S. Lockheed Martin facilities in: Fort Worth (Texas), Greenville (South Carolina), Marietta (Georgia) and Palmdale (California).

These facilities have different purposes and specialize in manufacturing distinct fighter and military aircrafts:

- **The Fort Worth facility** is the largest assembly and maintenance site for the F-35 fighter jet in the world. It was the primary destination for Canadian shipments of F-35 parts and is strategically key for the supply chain and manufacturing of the jet.¹³
- **The Greenville site** is the global center for the F-16, from the production of new models to serving as the first depot in the continental United States for sustainment support services.¹⁴ Since their introduction in 2003, the F-16I is one of the primary combat aircraft used by the Israeli Air Force and has been the main aircraft used in its bombardment of Gaza.¹⁵
- **The Marietta plant** is the home of the C-130 Hercules production line and the plant also sustains operations for the F-22 Raptor and the C-5M Super Galaxy.¹⁶ Squadron 131’s C-130 Hercules functions as a key logistical instrument for sustained military operations, enabling the large-scale deployment of forces and material that perpetuates the genocide in Gaza. Its capacity for mass casualty evacuation and nighttime assaults underscores its integral role in

¹¹ [Legal battles loom over supply chain keeping Israeli F-35s flying over Gaza and Lebanon](#), Middle East Eye, 4 October 2024.

¹² [U.S. F-35 Sustainment Lead Details Israel Fleet Ops Since October](#), Aviation Week Network, 10 April 2024.

¹³ [Texas](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

¹⁴ [Greenville](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

¹⁵ [The UK companies arming – and the people resisting – the occupation of Palestine](#), Declassified UK, 23 November 2023.

¹⁶ [Marietta](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

a protracted and devastating war effort.¹⁷ The Marietta plant is also home to the F-35 Center Wing Assembly,¹⁸ meaning that some of the shipments go to Marietta first and then travel to Fort Worth to be shipped to Israel.

- **The Palmdale plant** specializes in the production of high-performance aircraft, including stealth and experimental models.¹⁹ It plays a crucial role in delivering highly specialized aircraft, including components that support U.S. and allied air combat operations. Since its contributions to the production of advanced fighter jets and unmanned systems, Palmdale has been integral in enabling air missions that impact war zones, including those related to the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

Following their export to the United States at these four facilities, the majority of cargo tracked in this report are ultimately shipped to **key actors in the Israeli defence sector including: Lockheed Martin Israel, Elbit Systems - Cyclone, and most importantly the Israel Ministry of Defense, as well as Nevatim Airbase (Israeli Air Force Base).**

Honeywell's Controllers

The following table shows 313 shipments of controller parts from Honeywell Asca (Mississauga ON) to Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth and Greenville facilities between April 3, 2024 and August 10, 2025 and then the shipments of 4 controllers to Lockheed Martin and Nevatim Airbase in Israel mere days later. It is important to note that these numbers do not represent the total amount of parts Honeywell sent to the U.S. and then to Israel, but simply offer a glimpse into this flow of military aircraft parts.

Honeywell Asca was awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program. Primarily under Prime Awards N0001921C0020, for the global F-35 air system sustainment, N0001915C0031, for a logistics support contract, N0001917C0001, for lots 12 for which Israel is supposed to receive 6 F-35I, and N0001917C0045,²⁰ which includes services for F-35 Lightning II aircraft in support of the government of Israel under the Foreign Military Sales program.²¹ Since 2019, the company has been awarded more than 248 subawards for "PTMS Controllers" which are the same goods revealed in **Table 1** leaving Lockheed Martin's F-35 facility in Texas for Lockheed Martin Israel and Nevatim Airbase. Both the U.S. DOD contracts as well as the specific facilities to which these parts are going imply that Honeywell's controllers end up in the infrastructure of the F-35I. Moreover, according to Honeywell's website, each F-35 contains over 100 unique Honeywell parts,²² including the Power and Thermal Management System shown below.

¹⁷ [IDF Hercules airplanes: Making history in the skies for 70 years](#), The Jerusalem Post, 29 August 2024.

¹⁸ [Lockheed Martin Marietta Site Delivers 1,000th F-35 Center Wing Assembly](#), Lockheed Martin, 9 April 2025.

¹⁹ [Palmdale](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

²⁰ [N0001921C0020, N0001915C0031, N0001917C0001, N0001917C0045](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

²¹ This is not an exhaustive list. Honeywell is involved in additional prime awards with Lockheed Martin for PTMS parts.

²² [Honeywell Enhances F-35 Support and Fleet Readiness](#), Honeywell Aerospace Technologies (as of November 2025).



Figure 1. **Honeywell's F-35 Power and Thermal Management System.**²³

Descriptions of the goods: Power & Thermal Management Controllers

- Honeywell's Power and Thermal Management System (PTMS) is a foundational, enabling technology for the F-35 Lightning II. It is a fully integrated system that consolidates the functions of four traditional aircraft systems – the Auxiliary Power Unit, Emergency Power Unit, Environmental Control System, and Thermal Management System – into a single unit.²⁴ The PTMS is not a simple component but is described as **"the heart and circulatory system of the F-35."**²⁵ It is a vital, integrated system that is crucial for the performance, viability, and mission success of the F-35.²⁶ **As the sole supplier of the PTMS for F-35 for the past two decades,²⁷ Honeywell PTMS Controllers are integrated in every F-35I.²⁸**

Table 1 details shipments of controllers from Canada to Israel through Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	14-04-24 to 14-11-24	Honeywell Aerospace, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Controller, Power & Thermal Management	174
			Lockheed Martin, Greenville, US	Controller, Power & Thermal Management	1
US > IL	18-11-24 to 18-11-24	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin, Tel Aviv, IL	Ptms Controller	1

²³ [Honeywell unveils new F-35 thermal management fix as Pentagon hunts for better cooling](#), Breaking Defense, 12 March 2024.

²⁴ [Honeywell Enhances F-35 Support and Fleet Readiness](#), Honeywell Aerospace Technologies (as of November 2025).

²⁵ [Honeywell's F-35 PTMS Surpasses One Million Flight Hours](#), Defense Advancement, 17 March 2025.

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ [Honeywell Cooling Technology Will Enable Next Generation Of F-35](#), Honeywell Aerospace Technologies, 11 March 2024.

²⁸ [Canadian Industry Takes Off With F-35 Lightning II](#), Cision, 29 May 2013.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	20-11-24 to 10-06-25	Honeywell Aerospace, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Controller, Power & Thermal Management	111
US > IL	17-06-25 to 25-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin, Tel Aviv, IL	Ptms Controller	3
			Nevatim Israeli Air Force Base, Naqab, IL		
CA > US	26-06-25 to 10-08-25	Honeywell Aerospace, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Controller, Power & Thermal Management	26
			Lockheed Martin, Greenville, US	Aircraft Parts, Controller, Power,	1

Table 1. Shipments of “controllers” from Honeywell to Lockheed Martin’s Forth Worth and Greenville facilities in the U.S. and then to Lockheed Martin’s Israeli facility and Nevatim between April 2024 and August 2025.

Heroux Devtek’s Uplock Systems

The following table shows 154 shipments of different subparts of “uplocks”, from Heroux Devtek (Laval, Quebec) to Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S. between April 2, 2024 and August 7, 2025, and then 12 similarly labelled shipments subsequently being transferred on to Israeli airforce bases, the Ministry of Defence and Lockheed Martin Israel. Some of the listed shipments appear to go from Fort Worth to Marietta before being shipped to Israel. It is important to note that these numbers do not represent the actual amount of parts Heroux Devtek sent to the U.S. and then to Israel, but simply a glimpse into the flow of military aircraft parts.

In 2009, Heroux Devtek was publicly recognized as a key F-35 supplier and reported additional production agreements to supply machined parts and assemblies for all three F-35 variants.²⁹ Upon reviewing U.S. federal contract awards, Heroux Devtek was awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program,³⁰ primarily under Prime Awards N0001920C0009, N0001920C0008 and N0001911C0083.³¹ Under these contracts are multiple subawards for “uplock assy” and different nomenclature which are the same goods listed in **Table 2** leaving Lockheed Martin’s F-35 facility in Texas for Lockheed Martin Israel, Elbit Systems Ltd in Haifa, Elbit Systems–Cyclone in Karmiel, the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and Nevatim Airbase. This is in addition to Heroux Devtek being the sole supplier of the uplocks, as the intellectual property of these components belongs to the company.³² This confirms that these uplock parts end up in the infrastructure of the F-35I, which has only been produced by

²⁹ [Lockheed Martin and Heroux Devtek sign contract](#), Wings Magazine, 28 April 2009.

³⁰ This is not an exhaustive list. Heroux Devtek is involved in additional prime awards with Lockheed Martin for uplock assembly/main landing gears.

³¹ [N0001920C0009, N0001920C0008, N0001911C0083](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

³² [39th session of the Standing Committee on National Defence, House of Commons Canada](#), 9 December 2010.

the manufacturer on all F-35 versions since 2004.^{33 34 35}

Descriptions of the goods: *Uplock Assembly (Main Landing Gear)*

- Uplock assemblies are mechanical and structural systems used on aircraft utility doors such as landing gears.³⁶ Their primary function is to securely lock doors in a closed position when they are not in use. For instance, uplock assemblies lock landing gear doors once the gear is fully retracted during flight, preventing unintentional door openings.³⁷ They are thus essential for the proper functioning of military aircrafts.

Table 2 details shipments of uplocks from Canada to Israel through Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	06-04-24 to 04-03-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	105
US > IL	04-03-25 to 04-03-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Turbine, Dcma, Aug Valve, Lck Assy	1
CA > US	12-03-25 to 30-05-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	23
US > IL	02-06-25 to 02-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Tester, Lock Assy, Valve	1
CA > US	03-06-25 to 03-06-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	3
US > IL	03-06-25 to 03-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Valve, Lock Assy, El Assy, lcs Ctl	1
CA > US	04-06-25 to 04-06-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	1

33 [Canada F-35 Industrial Participation, Lockheed Martin](#), 23 September 2019.

34 [Heroux-Devtek Recognized by Lockheed Martin as a Top Performing Supplier on the F-35 Lightning II Program](#), Globe Newswire, 25 May 2016.

35 [Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

36 Ibid.

37 [Alternative uplock release assembly](#), Google Patents, 10 August 2008.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
US > IL	18-06-25 to 18-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Panel Assy, Lock Assy, Booster, Tes	1
CA > US	21-06-25 to 21-06-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	4
US > IL	25-06-25 to 02-07-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Ac Generator, Lock Assy, Smoke Dete	1
		Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Aft Uplock Actuator	1
CA > US	03-07-25 to 08-07-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	10
US > IL	10-07-25 to 11-07-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Winch, Lock Assy, Mfcd, Pnuematic C	1
		Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin Israel Ltd, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL Nevatim Israeli Air Force Base, Naqab, IL	Hook Assy-Aft Uplock Wbd, Lock Assy	3
CA > US	15-07-25 to 15-07-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	2
US > IL	20-07-25 to 20-07-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Ministry Of Defense Government Of Israel, Tel Aviv Jaffa, IL	Lock Assy, Pneumatic Ctrl, Door Act	1
CA > US	29-07-25 to 29-07-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	2
US > IL	30-07-25 to 30-07-25	Boeing Distribution Services, Hialeah, Us	Elbit Systems, Haifa, IL	Lock	1

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	02-08-25 to 04-08-25	Heroux Devtek, Laval, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Uplock Assy	4

Table 2. **Shipments of “locks” from Heroux Devtek to Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth and Marietta facilities and then from these same facilities to Lockheed Martin Israel, the Israeli Minister of Defense, and Nevatim Base between April 2024 and August 2025.**

Magellan’s Tiebars

The following table presents 110 shipments of “tiebars” from the manufacturer Magellan Aerospace (Kitchener, Ontario)³⁸ between May 29, 2024 and August 11, 2025 to Lockheed Martin’s F-35, C-130J, and Palmdale facilities, and then 11 shipments of “tiebars” from Fort Worth to Elbit Systems - Cyclone shortly afterwards. It is important to note that these numbers do not represent the actual amount of parts Magellan sent to the U.S. and then to Israel, but simply a glimpse into the flow of military aircraft parts.

According to U.S. federal contracts, Magellan, here represented by Chicopee Manufacturing Limited, was awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Program, primarily under Prime Award N0001916R0033,³⁹ who explicitly mention the government of Israel as a receiver of ten lot 11 of the F-35.⁴⁰ Since 2019, Magellan has been awarded 62 subawards for the production of “tiebars”, which are the same good listed in **Table 3** leaving Lockheed Martin’s F-35 facility in Texas for Elbit Systems - Cyclone in Karmiel, known for Forward Equipment Bay assemblies for the F-35⁴¹ and different parts for the F-35 chassis.⁴² Magellan Kitchener has been named a key supplier by Lockheed Martin as well as manufacturing “critical” hardware such as “components for machined Wing Tie Bars for the Leading Edge Flap installation and Aft Engine Thrust Mounts.”⁴³

Descriptions of the goods: Tiebars

- Tiebars (or tie rods) are structural tension elements used mainly in wing construction.⁴⁴ To prevent in-flight separation and damage, tie bars are secured to the joints, curbs, and shoulders of an aircraft, linking adjoining structures.⁴⁵ Upon delivery, these parts will be integrated across the entire F-35 fleet, including the F-35A which Israel uses, F-35B, and F-35C variants.⁴⁶

38. Magellan was awarded contracts from Lockheed Martin for all three variants of the F-35 fighter jet. The manufacturer announced in a [press release](#) they had signed a four year contract with Lockheed Martin to deliver “shipsets of machined wing tie bars for the aircraft’s leading edge flap”. Magellan was the first international partner of the F-35 program, delivering equipment and technology to program partners, but also the eight foreign military sales customers, with Israel being one of them.

39. [N0001916R0033](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

40. This list is not exhaustive. Magellan is involved in additional prime awards with Lockheed Martin related to tiebar parts.

41. [Elbit Systems Awarded Contract to Supply Additional Complex Composite Structural Assemblies for the F-35 Aircraft](#), Elbit Systems, 14 September 2020.

42. [Israeli Tech Boosts F-35](#), Elbit Systems, 7 August 2024.

43. [Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

44. [Airframe & Aircraft Components](#), L.N.V.M. Society Group of Institutes, March 2007.

45. [Magellan Aerospace Signs Titanium Component Contract for F-35 Wing Development](#), The Defense Post, 25 November 2025.

46. Ibid

Table 3 details shipments of tiebars from Canada to Israel through Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	29-05-24 to 04-12-24	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	17
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	05-12-24 to 05-12-24	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL	Tiebar	2
CA > US	11-12-24 to 17-12-24	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US	Tiebar	3
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	22-12-24 to 22-12-24	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL	Tie Bar	1
CA > US	24-12-24 to 05-02-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	10
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	11-02-25 to 11-02-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		1
CA > US	12-02-25 to 21-02-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	5
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
US > IL	22-02-25 to 22-02-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		2
CA > US	24-02-25 to 24-02-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Tiebar	1
US > IL	24-02-25 to 24-02-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US		1
CA > US	25-02-25 to 19-03-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	2
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	20-03-25 to 20-03-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		1
CA > US	23-03-25 to 24-03-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US	Tiebar	2
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	25-03-25 to 25-03-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		1
CA > US	25-03-25 to 25-03-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, MARIETTA, US	Tiebar	1
US > IL	26-03-25 to 26-03-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		1

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	26-03-25 to 28-04-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	10
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		
US > IL	29-04-25 to 29-04-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Elbit Systems - Cyclone Ltd, Karmiel, IL		1
CA > US	30-04-25 to 11-08-25	Magellan Aerospace, Kitchener, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Tiebar	59
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Palmdale, US		
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US		

Table 3. **Shipments of “tiebars” from Magellan to Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, Marietta, and Palmdale facilities and then to Elbit Systems in Karmiel between May 2024 and August 2025.**

Cyclone Manufacturing’s Wings

The following table describes 34 shipments of different subparts of “wings” from Cyclone Manufacturing Inc., (Mississauga, Ontario) to Fort Worth Texas between November 14, 2024 and August 1, 2025, and then 7 shipments of wing parts from that facility to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Nevatim Airbase. It is important to note that these numbers do not represent the actual amount of parts Cyclone sent to the U.S. and then to Israel, but simply a glimpse into the flow of military aircraft parts.

In the case of Cyclone Manufacturing, while no contract has been published by the DOD, the company is part of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 program as per their website,⁴⁷ and lists the American manufacturer as one of their clients.⁴⁸ As an Original Equipment Manufacturer,⁴⁹ meaning that a service or product is officially certified or endorsed by the original manufacturer of a specific piece of equipment or vehicle, Cyclone Manufacturing listed IAI and Lockheed Martin,⁵⁰ reaffirming the relationship between the Mississauga manufacturer and military aircrafts. **Table 4** showcases components going to Israel Aerospace Industries, known for supporting Lockheed Martin’s assembly of the F-35-Outer wing box,⁵¹ further substantiating

47 [Mississauga’s Cyclone Manufacturing launches \\$65M expansion project](#), Canadian Manufacturing, 9 August 2017.

48 [Lockheed Martin](#), Cyclone MFG Inc (as of November 2025).

49 [What does OEM approved mean?](#), Oil Store, 3 July 2025.

50 [Cyclone Approvals](#), Cyclone MFG Inc, 27 February 2025.

51 [F-35 Aerostructures](#), IAI (as of November 2025).

Cyclone's involvement in the manufacturing of the fighter jet.

Descriptions of the goods: Spar Wing

- Spars are the main structural components of an aircraft wing (the skeleton), running from the fuselage to the wingtip along the lateral axis.⁵² Spars come in various cross-sectional shapes often designed to balance strength and weight.^{53 54} They also transfer wing loads to the fuselage structure and support the landing gear system.⁵⁵

Table 4 details shipments of spar wings from Canada to Israel through Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
CA > US	14-11-24 to 14-04-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Spar Wing	11
			Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Marietta, US	Wing	1
US > IL	16-04-25 to 16-04-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd, Lod Airport, IL	Wing, Front Spar Assembly	2
CA > US	17-04-25 to 13-05-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Spar Wing	5
US > IL	19-05-25 to 19-05-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd, Lod Airport, IL	Wing, Front Spar	1
CA > US	27-05-25 to 29-05-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	3
US > IL	02-06-25 to 02-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd, Lod Airport, IL	Wing, Front Spar Assembly	1
CA > US	21-06-25 to 21-06-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Spar Wing	2
US > IL	29-06-25 to 29-06-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd, Lod Airport, IL	Wing, Front Spar Assy	2
CA > US	03-07-25 to 21-07-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Spar Wing	10

⁵² [Airframe & Aircraft Components](#), L.N.V.M. Society Group of Institutes, March 2007.

⁵³ [Wing Spars](#), ViewTech (as of November 2025).

⁵⁴ [22.16.2. Main Wing Box](#), Abbott Aerospace UK Ltd (as of November 2025).

⁵⁵ [Airframe & Aircraft Components](#), L.N.V.M. Society Group of Institutes, March 2007.

Shipment Route	Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Sender	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
US > IL	01-08-25 to 01-08-25	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd, Lod Airport, IL	Wing, Front Spar Assy	1
CA > US	05-08-25 to 05-08-25	Cyclone Manufacturing, Mississauga, CA	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Fort Worth, US	Spar Wing	2

Table 4. **Shipments of “wings” from Cyclone Manufacturing to Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth and Marietta facilities and then to Israel Aerospace Industries and Nevatim Base, between November 2024 to August 2025.**

Canadian Shipments Fueling Lockheed Martin’s F-35 War Machine

While the previous section detailed the supply chain of military aircraft parts shipped to Israel via Lockheed Martin’s U.S. facilities, the vast majority of Canadian F-35 parts sent to Texas are incorporated into the Fort Worth assembly line to build F-35 jets. The jets manufactured in Fort Worth are then sent to various clients globally, notably including Israel as one of the most significant recipients of F-35s. The export data below identifies shipments of F-35 components from Canadian manufacturers to the F-35 assembly line in Texas, for assembly into fighter jets, some of which are later destined for Israel.

Shipments of Canadian-made Components to the F-35 Assembly Line

To further demonstrate Canada’s integral role in the F-35 supply chain, this section analyzes export data from September 24, 2023 to August 9, 2025 revealing the ongoing flow of components from Canadian factories to the Lockheed Martin assembly line. The findings are based on a detailed review of **360 shipments destined for Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas from four defence companies across Canada:** Apex Industries (Moncton, NB), Asco Canada (Delta, BC), Centra Industries (Cambridge, ON), and Magellan (Kitchener, ON).

These four manufacturers represent only a fraction of the more than a hundred Canadian F-35 suppliers,⁵⁶ and the shipping records detailed below are only a snapshot of the flow of Canadian parts to the F-35 assembly line in the U.S. In total, more than 8,500 military shipments were identified from Canadian factories to Lockheed Martin facilities in the U.S. **Canada is deeply embedded in a complex and sustained supply chain for American-made military systems destined for the Israeli military.**⁵⁷

Shipments of F-35 parts from Canada to Lockheed’s Fort Worth facility were tracked from the following four manufacturers:

- **Apex Industries (Moncton, NB):**⁵⁸ Apex Industries has sent more than 110 shipments

⁵⁶ [F-35 Suppliers](#), World Beyond War, 11 December 2024.

⁵⁷ For a more comprehensive and exhaustive picture of Canadian F-35 suppliers, World Beyond War has documentation exposing them ([Map of Canadian F-35 suppliers](#) and [Complicit Companies](#)).

⁵⁸ In the case of Apex Industries, an article from June 2024 mentions that the Moncton-based company is a supplier that manufactures components for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 fighter jet program. The company’s CEO, Keith Parlee, confirmed this supply relationship, stating that Apex “makes dozens of parts for the F-35” and is a “supplier for various military contractors.” The article continues by saying that

of different parts to Fort Worth between October 3, 2023 and July 31, 2025. The majority of goods being related to “brackets” and “fitting support” for the leading edge flap. The first component serves as structures for the F-35 forward fuselage.⁵⁹ The latter is used for the F-35's performance, stealth, and structure and it is a custom-shaped seal that fits into the gap between the moving Leading Edge Flap and the fixed wing structure.

Apex was previously awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program, primarily under Prime Award N0001917C0001 for production lot 12, from which Israel is supposed to receive six F-35s, N0001914C0002, which explicitly mentions Israel as a receiver of seven F-35s from lot 9, and under N0001920C0009 for lot 15.⁶⁰

- **Asco Canada (Delta, BC):**⁶¹ Asco Canada has sent more than 45 shipments of different parts to Fort Worth between September 29, 2023 to June 23, 2025. The majority of these were “Bulkhead” and other machined parts, which Lockheed Martin officially recognizes as components of the F-35's airframe assemblies made by Asco.⁶² These are structural components within an aircraft that primarily serve to divide and reinforce the fuselage into distinct sections.⁶³ In complex aircraft like the F-35, bulkheads manufactured by suppliers such as Asco Aerospace are classified as part of the fuselage structure.⁶⁴ These bulkheads are sometimes called “wing major bulkheads”⁶⁵ in recognition of their structural role in bearing wing loads and providing mounting points for the wings.⁶⁶

Asco was previously awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program, primarily under Prime Award N0001917C0001 for lots 12-14, from which Israel is supposed to receive eighteen F-35s, and under N0001920C0009 for lot 15-17.⁶⁷

- **Centra Industries (Cambridge, ON):** Centra Industries has sent more than 174 shipments of different parts to Fort Worth between October 4, 2023 and August 9, 2025. The majority of these were primarily “Assembly of bulkhead radars,” which are both a structural and electronic integration point,⁶⁸ important to the aircraft's avionics suite and particularly its radar capabilities. Bulkheads are critical structural components that form the “backbone” of the airframe. They provide strength and rigidity to the aircraft structure while helping to reduce overall weight. They are essential for maintaining the airframe under extreme conditions, such as high G-forces during flight, and contribute to the durability of the fighter jet. They also play a role in defining and supporting the aircraft's internal compartments and systems, including the center fuselage which houses vital components like the weapons bay

“the company has ‘no control’ over how its products are used by military contractor Lockheed Martin.” In a now deleted article from the Telegraph Journal, Apex Industries is mentioned as being the manufacturer of 63 parts of the F-35 fighter jet.

59 [Canadian Industry Takes Off With F-35 Lightning II](#), Cision, 29 May 2013.

60 [N0001917C0001](#), [N0001914C0002](#), [N0001920C0009](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

61 ASCO Aerospace Canada is a major supplier for the F-35 program, manufacturing bulkheads, the fighter jet's “[single largest component](#).” By 2022, the company had produced 600 of these parts. These components are exported for integration into all F-35 aircraft, including the advanced F-35I “Adir”.

62 [Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

63 [Airframe & Aircraft Components](#), L.N.V.M. Society Group of Institutes, March 2007.

64 [Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II](#), Lockheed Martin (as of November 2025).

65 [Canada F-35 Industrial Participation](#), Lockheed Martin, 23 September 2019.

66 [Lockheed Martin recognizes Canadian suppliers for F-35 Lightning II](#), Skies Mag, 30 May 2013.

67 [N0001917C0001](#), [N0001920C0009](#), HigherGov, (as of November 2025).

68 [F-35 Mission Systems Design, Development, and Verification](#), AIAA AVIATION Forum, 1 May 2018.

and fuel reservoirs.^{69 70 71}

Centra was previously awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program, primarily under Prime Award N0001917C0001 for lot 12, from which Israel is supposed to receive 6 F-35I, under N0001920C0009 for lot 15, and under N0001916C0033,⁷² who explicitly mention Israel as a receiver of six aircraft from lot 11 of the F-35. Since 2020, the company has been awarded 20 subcontracts for different production runs of the F-35.

- **Magellan (Kitchener, ON):** In addition to the shipments mentioned in the previous section, Magellan has also sent more than 31 shipments of different parts to Fort Worth between October 3, 2023 and July 16, 2025. The majority being for “Fuel Floor Extension” and other similar descriptions referring to a structural modification or addition beneath the main floor designed to accommodate fuel tanks or increase fuel capacity. This extension allows the aircraft to carry additional fuel, thereby extending its range or endurance without major changes to the wing structure.^{73 74 75 76} This term is commonly used in contexts where aircraft structures are adapted for enhanced fuel capacity beyond the original design, such as for the Israeli F-35.

Magellan was previously awarded subcontracts from Lockheed Martin for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Program, primarily under Prime Award N0001917C0001 for lot 12, from which Israel is supposed to receive six F-35I, and under N0001920C0009⁷⁷ for lot 15. Since 2021, the company has been awarded six subcontracts for lot 12 and 15 of the F-35.

These components were primarily shipped to the U.S. through the Vancouver International Airport, Toronto Pearson International Airport, and the Moncton International Airport.

The F-35 Fighter Jet’s Role in Israel’s Genocide

F-35 fighter jet parts and components are continuing to be sent to Israel as it uses these planes to wreak death and destruction on a besieged population in the most intensive bombing campaign of the twenty-first century.⁷⁸ Israel has used its fleet of F-35s at a higher tempo than any other user globally throughout the last two years,⁷⁹ with each aircraft conducting two-four daily sorties in rapid bombing runs from Nevatim Air Base to Gaza.⁸⁰ Israel has frequently, publicly, and proudly proclaimed how essential its F-35’s have been to the overall aerial campaign

69 [Bulkhead](#), Globeair (as of November 2025).

70 [Engineering Speed, Stealth and Agility](#), Howmet Aerospace, (as of November 2025).

71 [GKN Aerospace Expands Commitment to F-35 Program](#), AIN, 17 July 2018.

72 [N0001917C0001, N0001920C0009, N0001916C0033](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

73 [How It Works: Aircraft fuel system](#), AOPA, 17 December 2019.

74 [Anatomy of Aircraft & Spacecraft](#), Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 1 January 2023.

75 [22.16.2. Main Wing Box](#), Abbott Aerospace UK Ltd (as of November 2025).

76 [Aviation Fuel Systems](#), CFI Notebook (as of November 2025).

77 [N0001917C0001, N0001920C0009](#), HigherGov (as of November 2025).

78 [Israel's Gaza bombing campaign is the most destructive of this century](#), analysts say, CBC News, 30 December 2023.

79 [Canada's Genocide Jet Builders - Stelia and Other Key Suppliers in the Global F-35 Supply Chain](#), Science for the People, 25 September 2025.

80 [U.S. F-35 Sustainment Lead Details Israel Fleet Ops Since October](#), Aviation Week Network, 10 April 2024.

that has demolished homes, destroyed infrastructure, and killed tens of thousands of civilians.⁸¹ The IDF reported on January 30, 2024 that it had bombed 29,000 sites in Gaza “mostly using F-35s and F-16s,”⁸² and announced on March 16, 2025 that its F-35s had logged 15,000 flight hours since October 2023 and done “thousands” of bombing runs over Gaza and other areas.⁸³ In the same thread, the Israeli military thanked Lockheed Martin for helping it to increase the bombing payload of the F-35 to a new “Beast Mode” configuration not used by any other airforce, dramatically increasing their destructive capacity.

The Canadian government, and the over a hundred Canadian suppliers of F-35 parts, ought to have known, as early as the end of 2023, that they were contributing to the devastating assault on Gaza. Yet the shipments have continued, uninterrupted, for two more years. **Canada is an integral part of the supply chain that makes these machines possible, and has an obligation under international law to stop exporting this technology to Israel by way of the U.S.**

Part 2: Shipments of Explosives from Canada to Israel via Major U.S. Munitions Plants

Canada plays a key role in the supply chain of explosives fueling Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza, both as a manufacturer and as a transit corridor.

This report reveals over 500 shipments of explosives – some of TNT made in a Nitro-Chem facility in Poland and shipped through Port Saguenay, QC, and some of propellants made in General Dynamics factories in Repentigny and Valleyfield, QC – that are delivered to critical U.S. bomb manufacturers. These U.S. munitions plants assemble devastating weapons, such as 2000-pound MK-84 and 155mm artillery shells, which the U.S. supplies to Israel to kill Palestinians and flatten Gazan neighbourhoods.

In total, the following analysis of commercially available shipping data identified **583 shipments of explosives and flammable solids originating from and transiting through Canada, destined for U.S. munition plants.** This section will detail how Canadian companies and Canadian transportation networks are used **to facilitate a supply of energetic explosive materials for manufacturing bombs and artillery shells subsequently used in Israel’s war on Gaza.**

This report shows a consistent flow of explosive materials from several key entities. First, it examines shipments of explosives from the Polish company Nitro-Chem, which arrive at Port Saguenay, Quebec, and then transit through Canada to the United States. Next, the report analyzes shipments of explosive material produced at the General Dynamics facilities in Repentigny and Valleyfield,

⁸¹ [Canada’s Genocide Jet Builders – Stelia and Other Key Suppliers in the Global F-35 Supply Chain](#), Science for the People, 25 September 2025.

⁸² [Israeli Air Force struck 31,000 targets in four months of war](#), Breaking Defense, 20 February 2024.

⁸³ [Israeli Air Force](#), X post, 16 March 2025.

Quebec and then exported to the U.S. These shipments of explosives transited through Quebec infrastructure and manufactured in Quebec factories were delivered to four key U.S. munitions plants:

- **McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP):** Assembles powerful bombs, including the 2000-pound MK-84, using Tritonal explosive. Remnants of these bombs, linked to a multi-billion dollar sale to Israel, have been found in Gaza marked with the plant's production code, "MCA".
- **Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP):** Handles the final assembly of munitions like 155mm artillery shells and 120mm tank rounds. Fragments of these specific munitions have been traced from attack sites in Gaza, including a UN school, back to this Iowa facility.
- **Red River Army Depot (RRAD):** In partnership with Lockheed Martin, it refurbishes M270 rocket artillery systems for the Israeli military and other allies, and has been identified as a key site for expediting weapons shipments to Israel.
- **Radford Army Ammunition Plant (RFAAP):** As the sole large-scale producer of military-grade nitrocellulose in North America, it manufactures the essential chemical propellant for ammunition. It specifically supplies the propellant for the tens of thousands of 155mm artillery shells the U.S. has provided to Israel.

This section will detail how Canadian infrastructure and companies are integral to this process, supplying key U.S. defense manufacturing sites that produce munitions for the U.S. Department of Defense – which are then supplied to the Israeli military and used in its war on Gaza.

Canada as a Conduit: How Polish TNTs Are Funneled Through Canada

This section examines the critical role Canada plays as a key transit hub for explosives manufactured internationally. Canadian infrastructure, specifically Port Saguenay in La Baie, Quebec, serves as the port of entry for massive shipments of TNT from Poland entering North America. Although these explosives are not made in Canada, Canadian ports are essential for facilitating their journey to key U.S. ammunition plants at a lower cost than continuing on ship. **The American munitions factories rely on this steady supply of TNT to manufacture the very bombs that Israel has consistently dropped in Gaza, making Canadian territory and infrastructure an indispensable link in a supply chain that fuels the conflict.**




Figure 2. **Flow of explosives shipments from NITRO-CHEM, a Polish TNT Manufacturer, through Port Saguenay (QC) before arriving at U.S. Army Ammunition Plants between December 2023 and July 2025.**

An analysis of shipping records exposes Canada's role as a crucial offloading point in global trade routes arming the Israeli state. By allowing its ports to be used as a Port of Entry and offloading point, companies are exploiting the U.S. Loophole to indirectly funnel explosive materials to Israel at a lower cost, bypassing the need to ship further by cargo ship and any semblance of accountability for fueling the ongoing brutalization of the Palestinian people.

Between October 2023 and November 2025, a staggering 433 shipments of explosives passed through Port Saguenay in La Baie, Quebec, destined for multiple U.S. defense manufacturers, including the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma, the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, and the Red River Army Depot in Texas, as detailed in **Table 5**. At the heart of this logistical pipeline is a massive, multi-year contract between the Polish state-owned explosives manufacturer Nitro-Chem and the U.S. firm Paramount Enterprises International (PEI). Under this agreement, vast quantities of TNT are being shipped on continental trade corridors by truck, from a Canadian port to the United States – explicitly earmarked for U.S. government weapons programs. This contract shows how Canadian infrastructure and territory is used to ensure the uninterrupted flow of explosive components for munitions that are ultimately destined for Israel's military.

Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
01-07-25 to 04-07-25	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	32
	Red River Army Depot, TX	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	5

Date Range (DD-MM-YY)	Receiver	Shipment Description	Quantity
14-05-25 to 17-05-25	Red River Army Depot, TX	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	19
	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC		13
12-04-25 to 15-04-25	Red River Army Depot, TX	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	30
	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	21
05-03-25 to 08-03-25	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	23
05-01-25 to 08-01-25	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	58
02-12-24 to 05-12-24	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	58
14-06-24 to 17-06-24	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	4
26-04-24 to 29-04-24	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	59
12-03-24 to 15-03-24	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	53
28-12-23 to 31-12-23	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	56
	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC		2

Table 5. **Shipments of NITRO-CHEM Explosives to U.S. Army Plants, via Paramount Enterprises, from Port Saguenay, from December 2023 to July 2025.**

The Polish-American Partnership: America's Top TNT Supplier

The supply chain originates with a significant deal between the Polish company Nitro-Chem and the U.S.-based Paramount Enterprises International (PEI).⁸⁴ As outlined in the PYM report, The Missing Ingredient: Polish TNT, Nitro-Chem, Europe's largest manufacturer of TNT, signed a contract to supply the explosive to the U.S. with PEI acting as the intermediary.⁸⁵ This partnership is substantial, with new long-term agreements for the delivery of thousands of tons of TNT to support U.S. government weapons programs. Poland's Deputy Defence Minister Cezary Tomczyk claims that **Nitro-Chem provides 90% of the U.S.'s TNT needs.**⁸⁶

PEI is a logistics company specializing in the transport of dangerous and high-value cargo for the defense and aerospace sectors. The company describes itself as a de facto proxy for the U.S. government in purchasing for its weapons programs. PEI operates dedicated "Class 1 HazMat-capable" ocean vessel services between Europe and North America multiple times a year to handle such sensitive cargo.

⁸⁴ [Poland's Nitro-Chem signs \\$310 million deal to supply TNT for US military](#), WIBQ AM, 09 April 2025.

⁸⁵ Missing Ingredient: Polish TNT, Nitro-Chem, Palestinian Youth Movement, November 2025

⁸⁶ [Polish company signs another deal to supply TNT for US Army](#), Polish Press Agency, 09 April 2025.

The TNT Corridor: Poland to Quebec

The transportation of the TNT from Nitro-Chem's factories in Bydgoszcz, Poland, is organized by the Polish company Pol-Mare, which acts as PEI's Polish agent, according to Polish defense industry reports and Nitro-Chem press releases.^{87 88} The destination for these transatlantic shipments is Port Saguenay in La Baie, Quebec, a choice that is highly strategic. While it was historically an industrial hub for aluminum and forestry, **Port Saguenay has in recent years become a key trade hub for military-grade explosives.** According to a 2006 Transportation Safety Board of Canada report, the port's Grande-Anse Terminal has the largest allowable limits for the in-transit storage of explosives in Canada.⁸⁹ Its relative isolation from major urban areas makes it a preferred location for handling such dangerous cargo, a function that is heavily restricted in busier ports like Montreal for public safety reasons. This specialization, authorized under Transport Canada regulations for Class 1 explosives, has made it the primary entry point for the PEI-Nitro-Chem supply line.

This logistics chain is corroborated by maritime shipping data. Records from commercial databases show that during the same period that these explosive shipments were registered, the cargo vessel MAJ Richard Winters (IMO: 9210309) docked at Port Saguenay, as seen in the image below, having sailed directly from Poland. Following the arrival of the vessel from Poland at Port Saguenay, a logistics operation is underway to transport explosives to the United States. Trucks are being loaded with materials documented as "ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS." The U.S. firm Paramount Enterprises International, which specializes in the shipment of munitions and explosives, is managing the overland transport. The company will truck the materials from the Canadian port to various American weapons manufacturing plants. **Figure 3** shows the days where the ship pinged its location within 1km of the port of Saguenay. Data was collected via available Automatic Identification System (AIS) which can be turned off to hide the ship's location at times.

87 [NITRO-CHEM SA has received further orders to supply TNT to the USA](#), Nitro-Chem, 08 November 2023.

88 Missing Ingredient: Polish TNT, Nitro-Chem, Palestinian Youth Movement, November 2025

89 [Marine Investigation Report M06L0045](#), Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 22 April 2006.




Figure 3. Days where MAJ RICHARD WINTERS cargo vessel was within 1km from the Port of Saguenay using AIS data, Green dots are AIS pings from the ship, from January 2023 to July 2025.

Once inside the United States, the TNT arriving from Quebec feeds a production line for powerful military munitions. At the Iowa and McAlester plants, this explosive material becomes the payload for aerial bombs, artillery shells, and tank rounds – the same categories of weapons documented in use by the Israeli military. Meanwhile, the Red River Army Depot works to overhaul key platforms like the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, a system also deployed by Israeli forces.

Canada as a Manufacturer: From Quebec Factories to U.S. Munitions Plants

While the shipments of Polish TNT reveal Canada's function as a critical logistical hub and transport corridor, a parallel stream of explosives used in Gaza originates directly from Canadian soil. From its facilities in Valleyfield and Repentigny, the defense contractor General Dynamics manufactures and ships essential military propellants to the United States, feeding the same ammunition plants as the Polish TNT. This section will examine domestic production, illustrating the direct integration of the Canadian defence industry into the U.S. military-industrial production.

Valleyfield, QC

Commercial shipping records indicate that between November 2023 and January 2025, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems - Canada (GD-OTS Canada) made at least 125 shipments described as "ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS" (Articles, Explosives, Not Otherwise Specified) and "flammable solids" by truck from its facility in Valleyfield, Quebec. These shipments, detailed in **Table 6**, were destined for two key U.S. Army ammunition plants: the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP) and the Radford Army Ammunition Plant (RAAP).




Figure 4. **Flow of explosives and flammable solid shipments from General Dynamics Vallefield (Quebec) to U.S. Army Ammunition Plants between November 2023 to October 2025.**

Year	Month	Receiver	Shipment Description	Shipments
2025	Jan	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	1
	Feb	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
	Mar	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
	May	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
	Jun	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	4
	Jul	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	4
	Aug	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	1
	Sep	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	11
	Oct	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	2
2024	Jan	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	5
	Feb	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	13
	Mar	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	15
	Apr	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
	May	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	6
	May	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC, IA	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	2
	Jun	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	9
	Jun	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC, IA	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	3

Year	Month	Receiver	Shipment Description	Shipments
	Jul	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	9
	Sep	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	3
	Oct	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
2023	Nov	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	Flammable Solid	7
	Dec	Radford Army Ammunition Plant, VA	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	1

Table 6. **Shipments of Explosives and Flammable Solids from General Dynamics (Valleyfield, QC) to U.S. Army Ammunition Plants, from December 2023 to October 2025.**

Given Valleyfield's specialized production, it is highly probable that these shipments consist of military-grade propellants. The GD-OTS Canada facility in Valleyfield is the sole North American supplier of M31A2 and M31-type triple-base propellant for the U.S. Army.⁹⁰

This exclusive role is highlighted in a U.S. Army contract modification. The award was made to the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) on behalf of General Dynamics, Valleyfield. The CCC is a federal Crown corporation, wholly owned by the Canadian government, which facilitates international trade deals, such as defense contracts over \$250,000, between Canadian suppliers and foreign governments. The modification, issued under the authority that there is "Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements," increased the contract ceiling by over \$972 million to a total of \$1.225 billion USD for the M31-Type Triple-Base Propellant.⁹¹ This propellant is a critical component for the 155mm Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) M232-series propelling charges.⁹²

The strategic importance of this production line is underscored by a separate U.S. government contract modification from September 26, 2024. The contract, valued at over \$55 million USD, was for an "M31A2 Triple Base acceleration effort" with the stated purpose of increasing supply "in support of Ukraine & Israel."⁹³ This specific propellant is essential for the 155mm MACS used in modern howitzers.⁹⁴

The propellants referenced in the General Dynamics contract, specifically the M31-Type and M31A2, are triple-base formulations designed for artillery. As a form of low explosive, their function is to deflagrate (burn extremely rapidly) to generate the immense gas pressure required to fire a projectile from a cannon. For regulatory, safety, and shipping purposes, these propellants are universally classified as Class 1 explosives – the standard classification for materials that present an explosion hazard, including military ammunition. Therefore, it is highly probable that large-scale shipments of this material from the Valleyfield plant would be categorized and transported as "explosives," directly linking the contract's contents to potential shipments of explosive materials.

⁹⁰ [Canada under contract to supply the IDF with artillery propellant](#), Project Ploughshares, 26 March 2025.

⁹¹ [M31-Type Triple-Base Propellant for 155mm MACS M232-Series Propelling Charges Contract Ceiling Increase](#), HigherGov, 12 May 2023.

⁹² [Valleyfield Military Propellant](#), General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems–Canada, January 2023.

⁹³ [Canada under contract to supply the IDF with artillery propellant](#), Ploughshares, 26 March 2025.

⁹⁴ [M31-Type Propellant for Modular Artillery Charge System \(MACS\)](#), HigherGov, 13 July 2022.

Further underscoring this supply chain, a diagram from the U.S. Army's Joint Program Executive Office for Armaments and Ammunition details the key suppliers for the 155mm artillery system. As shown in the diagram, General Dynamics in Valleyfield, Canada is listed as the key supplier for the M31A2 Propellant. The diagram then shows that the "Load, Assemble, and Pack" of the final M232A2 propellant charges, which use the M31A2 propellant, is conducted by American Ordnance (AO) in Middletown, Iowa. This facility is the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP), the government-owned, contractor-operated plant run by American Ordnance LLC, and the destination of several of the Valleyfield shipments.⁹⁵




Figure 5. **Diagram of a 155mm Munition System and its Suppliers.**⁹⁶

Repentigny, QC

Shipping records indicate that General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems - Canada (GD-OTS Canada) headquarters in Repentigny, Quebec, has dispatched at least 25 shipments by truck described as "ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS" (Articles, Explosives, Not Otherwise Specified), as detailed in Table 7 below. These shipments were routed to two critical U.S. military installations: the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP) in Middletown, Iowa, operated by American Ordnance LLC, and the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP) in Oklahoma.

⁹⁵ [Iowa Army Ammunition Plant \(IAAAP\) Fact Sheet](#), U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command.

⁹⁶ [Canada under Contract to Supply the IDF with Artillery Propellant](#), Ploughshares, 26 March 2025.




Figure 6. **Flow of explosives shipments from General Dynamics Repentigny (Quebec) to U.S Army Ammunition Plants between February 2024 and October 2025.**

Year	Month	Receiver	Shipment Description	Shipments
2025	Jan	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	1
	Jun	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	2
	Jul	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	2
	Sep	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	1
	Oct	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	7
2024	Feb	Iowa Army Ammunition Plant American Ordnance LLC, IA	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	2
	Mar	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	3
	Jun	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	1
	Oct	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	1
	Nov	McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK	ARTICLES EXPLOSIVES, NOS	4

Table 7. **Shipments of explosives from General Dynamics (Repentigny, QC) to U.S. Army Plants, from November 2024 until October 2025.**

GD-OTS Canada's facility in Repentigny serves as the headquarters for GD-OTS Canada and is a major cartridge manufacturing facility, specializing in Load, Assemble, and Pack

(LAP) operations. The Canadian government has designated it as a centre of excellence for ammunition production. While the specific purpose of these particular shipments is unconfirmed, an examination of General Dynamics' Canadian operations and the activities at the recipient U.S. plants provides critical context. GD-OTS Canada is a known manufacturer of mortar and artillery ammunition.

A direct link between General Dynamics' Canadian operations and military supplies destined for Israel is evident in a recent arms deal approved by the U.S. government. The proposed sale involves 50,000 units of M933A1 120mm High Explosive (HE) mortar cartridges, valued at an estimated \$61.1 million USD. The official notice from the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency explicitly names the principal contractor as GD-OTS, located in Quebec.^{97 98} This contract, intended for the Government of Israel, is scheduled for deliveries to begin in 2026. Given this major upcoming order, it is plausible that some of the ongoing shipments of explosives from Repentigny to key U.S. ammunition plants are advance preparations to fulfill this contract.

This deal underscores the Repentigny facility's capability to produce and supply significant quantities of explosive ordnance for the Israeli military. This highlights how the U.S. Loophole effectively bypasses Canadian government oversight on the final destination of these military goods. While the Canadian government has stated that it stopped approving new permits for lethal arms exports to Israel in early 2024, this arrangement allows for the continued flow of Canadian-manufactured munitions to the Israeli military.

The destinations of the Repentigny shipments, the Iowa and McAlester Army Ammunition Plants, are central to the production of a wide range of munitions for the U.S. military and its allies. The Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, operated by a Day & Zimmermann subsidiary, is involved in the production of 155mm artillery shells and has a history of supplying munitions to Israel.⁹⁹ The McAlester Army Ammunition Plant is a primary facility for the production, storage, and renovation of conventional ammunition, including the MK80 series of bombs.

From Canadian Cargo to Israeli Munitions: The Role of U.S. Ammunition Plants

Both the Polish-made TNT that transits through Canada and the explosives made in Quebec are shipped to critical U.S. Army industrial plants that form the backbone of North America's integrated munitions production. The following section will provide an overview of four primary facilities in this supply chain: the Radford Army Ammunition Plant, the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, and the Red River Army Depot.

⁹⁷ [U.S. Names Quebec Contractor In Newly Approved Arms Sale To Israel](#), The Maple, 15 August 2024.

⁹⁸ [Israel – M933A1 120mm High Explosive Mortar Cartridges](#), Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 13 August 2024.

⁹⁹ [A private US munitions manufacturer. It operates a munitions plant in Iowa that has been the source of many of the artillery munitions used by the Israeli military during the Gaza genocide](#), Investigate, 1 May 2024.

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (MCAAP)

The McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma is a primary destination for these explosive shipments, receiving a total of 109 deliveries. It is highly probable that these shipments consist of TNT, given their origin from the Polish manufacturer Nitro-Chem, a major global supplier of the material. **At McAlester, TNT is the essential ingredient for producing Tritonal**, a powerful explosive mixture of TNT and aluminum powder. This Tritonal **serves as the primary explosive fill for two of the most destructive munitions in the U.S. arsenal, both of which are assembled at the plant: the 2000-pound MK-84 general-purpose bomb and the I-2000 penetrator warhead.**¹⁰⁰




Figure 7. The different components of the MK-84, a U.S.-made bomb.¹⁰¹

The production of these specific bombs at McAlester is directly tied to a massive \$2.04 billion USD Foreign Military Sale to Israel. The sale authorizes the transfer of 35,529 units of MK-84 bomb bodies and 4,000 units of I-2000 penetrator warheads. The prime contractors for this

¹⁰⁰ [MK84 General Purpose Bomb](#), 22 April 2000.

¹⁰¹ [Mk 84 Bomb](#), *Global Defense News*, 27 July 2025.

major sale are listed as General Dynamics, Ellwood National Forge, and the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, directly connecting the explosives shipped from Port Saguenay, QC, to munitions intended for the Israeli military.¹⁰²

The connection between this U.S. plant and the Israeli military is not just contractual; it is physically verifiable. Photographic evidence, such as the image below, reveals MK-84 bombs used by Israel stamped with production codes beginning with "MCA" – the official designation for the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. This marking provides proof that **the munitions assembled at this facility, using components shipped through Canada, are the same weapons being deployed in Israel.**



Figure 8. Israeli Air Force loading a MK 84 Bomb made in the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant to a fighter jet (Top).¹⁰³ MK 84 being manufactured in the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (Bottom).¹⁰⁴

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP)

The supply chain of explosives originating in Quebec also extends to the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAP). This facility in Middletown, Iowa, is operated by American Ordnance LLC, a subsidiary of the private defense contractor Day & Zimmermann. The plant's operations are directly funded by the U.S. government through substantial military contracts.

¹⁰² [Israel – Munitions And Munitions Support](#), Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 28 February 2025.

¹⁰³ [Israel Awards Elbit Systems Energetics Plant For Air-Launched Weapons Deals](#), Aviation Week, 26 October 2023.

¹⁰⁴ [Bombs Away–McAlester Army Ammunition Plant \(MCAAP\)](#), YouTube, 22 September 2009.

On August 15, 2025, the U.S. Army's Joint Program Executive Office Armaments & Ammunition and U.S. Army Contracting Command Rock Island awarded contract W519TC-25-C-0032 with a ceiling of \$635,200,000 USD to MSM Group North America Inc. This contract is to design, build, and commission a modern 155mm Load, Assemble, and Pack facility at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant.¹⁰⁵ The contract was awarded on a non-competitive, sole-source basis with the primary intent of supporting U.S. allies, including Israel.¹⁰⁶ This contractual relationship positions the plant as a critical node in the production of munitions that are ultimately transferred to Israel.

The IAAP is a known source of the very munitions documented in the hands of the Israeli military in Gaza, including 155mm artillery shells and 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) rounds, which are fired by Israel's Merkava tanks. Serial numbers on M830A1 shell fragments were found at the scene of an attack on a United Nations school in Gaza,¹⁰⁷ and again where six-year-old Hind Rajab and her family were killed, trace production specifically back to the Iowa plant.¹⁰⁸



Figure 9. **Israeli Army near Gaza's border, preparing the 155mm shell made in the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (Top). The 155mm being produced in the plant (Bottom).**¹⁰⁹

105 [Design, Build, and Commission a Modern 155MM LAP facility at IAAAP](#), Higher Gov, 30 August 2025.

106 [M795 Melt Pour IAAAP Sources Sought FINAL 2025-03-06 AMND 4.pdf](#), Higher Gov, 6 March 2025

107 [Israel Is Killing Whole Families in Gaza—With Weapons Made in America](#), The Nation, 21 October 2024.

108 [Palestinian paramedics said Israel gave them safe passage to save a 6-year-old girl in Gaza. They were all killed](#), Visual Forensics, 16 April 2024.

109 [IOWA Army Ammunition Plant - Quality - Video News Release](#), Youtube, 22 September 2009.

The transfer of these weapons occurs through U.S. government channels, not direct sales. In a clear example from December 2023, the U.S. government used emergency powers to bypass congressional review and approve the shipment of nearly 14,000 units of M830A1 tank rounds to Israel. This transfer, valued at \$106.5 million USD and funded by U.S. taxpayers, was drawn directly from the U.S. Army's own inventory – a stockpile supplied by this facility. **The explosives delivered from Canada are therefore essential raw materials used in a production line directly subsidized by the U.S. government, producing munitions verifiably used in documented attacks on Palestinians.**



Figure 10. **A fragment of a 120mm M830A1 tank round, the same type produced at the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant. This specific piece was documented at the scene of the attack that killed six-year-old Hind Rajab and the paramedics sent to rescue her.**¹¹⁰

Radford Army Ammunition Plant (RFAAP)

The Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Virginia, operated by BAE Systems, is North America's only producer of military-grade nitrocellulose, the main chemical base for most modern gun propellants,¹¹¹ and it **manufactures propellants used in 155mm artillery charges and in the MK-90 motor for Hydra 70 rockets carried on Apache helicopters.**¹¹² In July 2022, the U.S. Army awarded BAE a five-year contract extension worth up to \$1.3 billion USD to keep the plant running through 2026.

Public shipping records show deliveries of “flammable solids” from General Dynamics’ Valleyfield plant in Quebec to Radford. As the supplier chart below shows, General Dynamics

¹¹⁰ [Palestinian paramedics said Israel gave them safe passage to save a 6-year-old girl in Gaza. They were all killed](#), Washington Post, 16 April 2024.

¹¹¹ [Radford moves to commissioning phase of a new nitrocellulose facility](#), BAE Systems, 3 March 2021.

¹¹² [BAE Systems Awarded \\$81 Million Munitions Contract for MK 90 Propellant Grain](#), MilitaryLeak, 3 January 2022.

Canada produces both nitroglycerin and the final M31A2 propellant. The M31A2 propellant requires both nitrocellulose, produced by Radford, and nitroglycerin. Taken together, the contract, the shared propellant chemistry, and the documented shipments make it highly plausible that General Dynamics is shipping the final propellant to Radford.




Figure 11. **155mm propellant supplier chart.**¹¹³

Those propellants are then loaded into U.S. munitions, including 155mm artillery shells that the United States has supplied to Israel. This production directly fuels Israel's military occupation and violence, as the United States has supplied tens of thousands of 155mm artillery shells to Israel for its war on Gaza.^{114 115} The shells are fired from the U.S.-made M109 self-propelled howitzers, a mainstay of Israel's military that has been consistently deployed in bombardments along the Gaza border.¹¹⁶ While Radford does not export finished weapons directly to Israel,

¹¹³ [155mm Artillery Munition System & Suppliers](#), National Defense Industrial Association, (as of November 2025).

¹¹⁴ [As Gaza Reels Under Attack, U.S. Approves Artillery Ammo Sale to Israel Bypassing Congressional Review](#), Defense Mirror, 30 December 2023.

¹¹⁵ [US to continue supplying Israel with artillery shells, guided missiles](#), Middle East Monitor, 22 November 2023.

¹¹⁶ [Israel is using these US-made weapons in its genocidal war on Gaza](#), TRT World, 5 January 2024.

it supplies the essential energetic materials that enable American-made ammunition to be produced and transferred, creating a direct industrial link that funnels Canadian components into that supply chain and effectively bypasses Canadian export controls. **This chain of supply helps sustain the munitions used in Israel's genocidal campaign in Gaza, including the bombardments carried out with the U.S.-made howitzers and rockets.**

Red River Army Depot (RRAD)

The Red River Army Depot (RRAD) in Texarkana, Texas, serves as a key facility in the U.S. supply chain for weapons used by the Israeli military in its operations in Gaza. As a designated "Center of Industrial and Technical Excellence," **the depot's primary function includes the overhaul and sustainment of the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).**¹¹⁷ The MLRS is a self-propelled mobile surface to surface rocket launcher.

This is not mere maintenance; it is a complete revitalization of the platform. Defense contractor Lockheed Martin openly admits its role in this process, stating it is under contract to recapitalize M270s for the U.S. Army and its allies. Crucially, Lockheed Martin specifies that, "in partnership with the Red River Army Depot, [it] is overhauling the M270s as 'zero-time' launchers," which includes a complete refurbishment of the system. The Red River Army Depot, therefore, is where these weapons systems are stripped down and rebuilt, emerging as good as new, their clocks reset to zero, ready for another lifetime of firing.^{118 119 120} This process ensures the launchers are paired with their lethal payloads, as the rockets and missiles fired by the M270 rely on powerful explosive fills for their destructive warheads.




Figure 12. **Guided unitary rocket, which is fired from the M270A1 and the HIMARS launcher.**¹²¹

117 [Red River Army Depot](#), U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, (as of November 2025).

118 [US Army deploys improved M270A2 rocket launcher in NATO exercise for the first time](#), Army Recognition, 27 August 2025.

119 [MLRS M270](#), Lockheed Martin, (as of November 2025).

120 [Red River set to provide MLRS fleet expansion](#), upgrade, U.S Army, 18 October 2018.

121 [M31 GMLRS Unitary](#), GlobalSecurity, 26 September 2023.

This is the same weapon system the Israeli army, which calls its upgraded version the “Menatetz” (“Smasher”), has used in its assault on Gaza. The industrial work performed at RRAD is not a neutral act of logistics; it directly ensures the operational capacity of the IDF's artillery.¹²²

A congressional letter from U.S. Representative Nathaniel Moran explicitly states that **RRAD has worked to "accelerate the delivery of combat systems to our allies in Israel."**¹²³ His public statements confirm strong support for Israel and for the depot's role in U.S. military readiness.

Tracing Canadian Explosives in U.S.-Made Bombs Used by Israel

The McAlester Pipeline: Supplying the 2000-Pound MK-84 Bomb

The MK-84 is the largest and most lethal conventional bomb in the U.S.-made MK-80 series, a 2,000-pound (907 kg) weapon of indiscriminate destruction. Its warhead is packed with over 400kg of Tritonal high explosive, the very material being shipped through Quebec's port. This immense power allows it to penetrate up to 11 feet of concrete, earning it the nickname "the Hammer" or "bunker buster." When outfitted with a JDAM guidance kit, it becomes a GBU-31, a so-called "precision-guided" munition frequently dropped by fighter jets like the F-15 and F-16 as well as the F-35.

The destructive force of an MK-84 is catastrophic, particularly when deployed in densely populated urban areas like Gaza. Munitions experts state that the lethal radius of an MK-84 bomb is up to 360 meters and the blast wave can cause severe injury as far as 800 meters from the point of impact.¹²⁴ The powerful blast wave alone can rupture lungs, tear limbs from bodies, and burst sinus cavities. For this reason, human rights organisations and weapons experts warn that explosive weapons with wide-area effects – such as 2,000-pound air-dropped bombs – should not be used in populated civilian areas because their blast effects cannot be contained.¹²⁵

Israel has a long and documented history of using these devastating weapons in its assaults on Gaza, with the U.S. acting as its chief supplier. Between October 2023 and May 2024 alone, the U.S. reportedly authorized the transfer of thousands of MK-84 bombs to Israel.

¹²² [Israel is using these US-made weapons in its genocidal war on Gaza](#), TRT World, 5 January 2024.

¹²³ [U.S. Congressman Nathaniel Moran](#), Congress of the United States, 30 May 2025.

¹²⁴ [Explosive weapons with large destructive radius: air-dropped bombs \(the Mark 80 series and Paveway attachments\)](#), AOAV, 1 March 2016.

¹²⁵ [Explosive weapons in populated areas](#), United Nations, 18 November 2022.



Figure 13. **Blast effect of an Israeli Air Strike at Al Mawasi Humanitarian safe zone in Gaza.**¹²⁶



Figure 14. **Israeli F-35I beside 4 MK-84 manufactured in the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant.**¹²⁷

¹²⁶ [What bombs did Israel use against the al-Mawasi 'safe zone' in Gaza?](#), AlJazeera, 10 September 2024.

¹²⁷ [Israeli F-35Is Providing Close Air Support To Troops In Gaza With 2,000-lb Bombs](#), The Avionist, 7 November 2023.

The real-world consequences are horrific. In one documented attack, the Israeli military dropped three U.S.-supplied MK-84 bombs on the Al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis – an area Israel itself had designated a humanitarian "safe zone" where displaced families were sheltering in tents. The strikes killed at least 40 Palestinians, including women and children, and left entire families buried under sand in the massive craters.¹²⁸

This was not an isolated incident. Human rights groups have repeatedly documented Israel's use of 2,000-pound bombs on residential buildings, refugee camps, and in other areas where Palestinians were told to seek safety.¹²⁹ A geospatial analysis published in PLOS Global Public Health provides stark evidence of this, identifying 592 craters from 2,000-pound bombs in Gaza between October 7 and November 17, 2023, alone. The study found that 83% of all hospitals in Gaza (30 out of 36) were within 800 meters – the potential range for infrastructure damage and injury – of at least one of these bomb detonations. Furthermore, a quarter of all hospitals had at least one bomb crater within the 360-meter lethal range.¹³⁰




Figure 15. **Proximity of bomb craters to hospitals and within the Israeli military designated evacuation zone in the Gaza Strip.**¹³¹

¹²⁸ [Israel hit Gaza's 'humanitarian safe zone' with US-supplied massive bombs: Rights group](#), Anadolu Ajansi, 10 August 2024.

¹²⁹ [Israel/OPT: US-made munitions killed 43 civilians in two documented Israeli air strikes in Gaza – new investigation](#), Amnesty International, 05 December 2023.

¹³⁰ [Are hospitals collateral damage? Assessing geospatial proximity of 2000 lb bomb detonations to hospital facilities in the Gaza Strip from October 7 to November 17, 2023](#), PLOS Global Public Health, 10 October 2024.

¹³¹ [Are hospitals collateral damage? Assessing geospatial proximity of 2000 lb bomb detonations to hospital facilities in the Gaza Strip from October 7 to November 17, 2023](#), PLOS Global Public Health, 10 October 2024.

The pipeline of explosives, passing quietly through a Canadian port and handled at facilities like the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, directly enables these atrocities and implicates Canada in the resulting death and destruction inflicted upon the Palestinian people.

McAlester's Spearhead: The I-2000 Penetrator Warhead

Alongside the MK-84, the U.S. supplies Israel with the I-2000 Penetrator or BLU-109, a specialized 2,000-pound "bunker buster" warhead designed for a single, brutal purpose: to destroy fortified and underground targets. A variant of the American BLU-109, the I-2000 is not simply a general-purpose bomb. Its design features a thick, hardened steel casing and a delayed-action fuse. This allows the warhead to smash through meters of reinforced concrete before its payload – filled with the same TNT that passes through Quebec – detonates deep inside the target.




Figure 16. **Anatomy of the BLU-109 Warhead.**¹³²

While the Pentagon markets these weapons for use against hardened military command centers, their deployment in the densely populated Gaza Strip represents a particularly vicious form of collective punishment. When an I-2000 strikes a multi-story residential

¹³² [General Dynamics's BLU-109 and the Mark-84 are among the largest bombs on the market](#), AlJazeera English, 10 August 2025.

building, it doesn't just explode on the surface. It penetrates several floors and detonates from within, causing a catastrophic structural collapse that "pancakes" the entire building. This ensures that anyone sheltering inside is crushed and buried alive. The shockwave and blast are momentarily contained, only to erupt with unimaginable force, destroying the building from its foundations up. For example, when a 2,000-pound Israeli bomb struck Gaza's Jabaliya refugee camp, the impact was described by a witness as being "like an earthquake". The attack resulted in the deaths of at least 195 Palestinians, with another 120 missing and 777 wounded. An entire residential neighborhood was targeted, leaving a scene of devastation resembling a natural disaster with multiple buildings collapsed in on themselves.¹³³



Figure 17. **"Palestinians gather at the site of Israeli strikes on houses in Jabaliya refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip, November 1, 2023."**¹³⁴

The I-2000 warhead is a key component of the same \$2.04 billion USD military sale to Israel. The production process clearly illustrates the interconnectedness of the U.S. military-industrial complex: the specialized steel casings are produced by companies like Ellwood National Forge, while the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant is responsible for filling them with the high explosives.

¹³³ [When a 2,000-pound Israeli bomb hit Gaza's Jabaliya refugee camp. 'It's like an earthquake'](#), Gulf News, 2 November 2023.

¹³⁴ [When a 2,000-pound Israeli bomb hit Gaza's Jabaliya refugee camp. 'It's like an earthquake'](#), Gulf News, 2 November 2023.



Figure 18. **BLU-109 shell being prepared to get filled with explosives in the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (Left)¹³⁵. Israeli F-16I with a BLU-109 bunker-buster warhead gets ready to depart (Right).¹³⁶**

Israel has systematically used these bunker busters to level apartment blocks, schools, and other civilian infrastructure in Gaza under the pretext of targeting underground tunnels or command centers. The result is always the same: entire families are wiped out in an instant, and rescue efforts are made nearly impossible by the sheer tonnage of collapsed concrete.

The quiet transit of TNT through Port Saguenay is therefore not just for one type of bomb, but for an entire arsenal that includes a range of deadly armaments. **This supply chain feeds the production of the I-2000, a weapon that gives the Israeli military the capacity to obliterate entire buildings and the lives within them.**

155mm Artillery Munition

The 155mm artillery shell is a powerful and widely used conventional munition – it is a system of essential parts that relies on a tightly integrated North American defense manufacturing industry. A complete 155mm round consists of four main components: the projectile, the explosive filling, the fuze, the primer. For the shell to be fired, the propelling charge is added behind the shell, which provides the explosive pushing force to fire the round.

The supply chain for these components flows directly through U.S. plants that often receive materials from Canadian producers. For instance, the propelling charges for the shells, known as the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS), utilize the M31A2 triple-base propellant. The U.S. Army contracts indicate that the sole North American supplier for this critical component is General Dynamics' facility in Valleyfield, Quebec.^{137 138} These propellants are shipped to the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP), where the M232 charges are assembled. **This creates**

¹³⁵ [Modernization to boost ammo plant's efficiency, capacity](#), U.S. Army, 6 October 2014.

¹³⁶ [Biden seeks to give Israel full access to U.S. weapons stockpiles](#), Military, 29 November 2023.

¹³⁷ [General Dynamics Plans Major Munitions Plant Expansion](#), Connect Canada Cre, 30 May 2024.

¹³⁸ [CCC, U.S. Army sign agreement for ramp-up in ammunition production](#), Financial Post, 25 March 2024.

a direct link between manufacturing in Quebec and the finished propelling charge.

The IAAAP is also responsible for the "load, assemble, and pack" (LAP) phase of production for the 155mm shell. This involves filling the projectiles with explosives and assembling the final shell. Shipments of explosives like TNT have been routed through Port Saguenay in La Baie, Quebec, to U.S. ammunition plants, including the IAAAP.

The finished 155mm artillery rounds, assembled at facilities like the IAAAP, have become a central tool in Israel's assault on Gaza. The United States has significantly increased its shipments of 155mm artillery shells to Israel, which are fired from Israel's large fleet of M109 self-propelled howitzers positioned along the Gaza border. This has resulted in relentless bombardments of the besieged strip. The use of these shells in a densely populated urban environment like Gaza has catastrophic consequences. Because they are unguided, 155mm artillery shells have a significant margin for error. Upon impact, the shell explodes, sending thousands of metal fragments in all directions and creating a lethal radius of up to 300 meters.¹³⁹

The sheer scale of the bombardments has been staggering. In the first month and a half of a military operation that began in 2023, Israeli artillery brigades fired approximately 10,000 of these shells into Gaza.¹⁴⁰ The number of children reported killed in Gaza in just three weeks of this genocide surpassed the annual number of children killed across all the world's conflict zones since 2019. The extensive use of 155mm artillery shells in Gaza has been a significant contributor to a humanitarian catastrophe, turning what was already a dire situation for civilians into an absolute nightmare.¹⁴¹

The Inadequacies of Canada's Arms Control Regime

Canada's current arms control regime is governed by its adherence to multilateral arms control mechanisms created by the United Nations (UN) and by longstanding agreements with the U.S. like the Defence Production Sharing Agreement. In 2019, Canada incorporated many important elements from the UN's Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) into domestic law through the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). This system is generally based on Canadian-based companies applying for export permits to sell weapons to another country. Each approved permit comes with a dollar value associated with it for a particular type of weapon. Companies can then sell weapons using that approved permit until the value is exhausted, and then they can then reapply. Throughout this process, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is meant to assess the risk associated with weapons in each permit. If GAC assesses that there is a substantial risk of potential exports being used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, they can then either deny a permit or require mitigation measures to lower the risk.

¹³⁹ [Joint open letter on transfer of 155mm artillery shells to Israel](#), Anera, 13 November 2023.

¹⁴⁰ [Canada under Contract to Supply the IDF with Artillery Propellant](#), Project Ploughshares, 26 March 2025.

¹⁴¹ [Imperialism's Shell Game](#), Law & Political Economy Project, 29 April 2024.

Gaps in Canada's Implementation of The Arms Trade Treaty

When Canada adopted the ATT into the EIPA, it left out some key provisions of the treaty in its revisions. In particular, it did not fully incorporate Articles 4 or 6, and this made the adoption of Article 7 weaker.¹⁴² These articles are crucial to fully implementing the ATT. The impact of these omissions can be explained as follows:

- **The Omission of Article 4:** By not adopting Article 4, Canada has allowed itself to have flexibility in the way it assesses and reports on parts of a weapon or weapon system. If it were to fully adopt Article 4, Canada would have to 1) treat the parts, components, and technology that could be assembled into a full weapons system (like a tank or a gun) the same as the full weapon when determining risk, and 2) assess the parts and components necessary to use arms, ammunition, implements or munitions of war on the same level of risk.
- **The Omission of Article 6:** Similarly, the absence of Article 6 allows the Minister of Foreign Affairs to have significant discretion to breach the spirit and intent of the ATT. Article 6 plainly states that, according to the treaty, transferring arms where there is serious risk of them being used in genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes is prohibited. No exemptions, no loopholes. Adopting Article 6 of the ATT would mean that ensuring that Canadian arms are prohibited from being used in war crimes becomes one of the core purposes of EIPA. Currently, that is not that case. This omission purposefully allows GAC to prioritize other foreign policy objectives over adherence to international law and protecting human rights.
- **Missing Clause from Article 7:** Canada's adoption of the ATT is imperfect because Canada didn't adopt Article 6, which would outright ban the export of weapons where there is a risk of war crimes or genocide, and thus the reference to Article 6 is missing from Canada's version of Article 7. Since no arms exports are banned outright, they are evaluated through the criteria laid out in Article 7, leaving the outcome entirely up to the discretion of the government.

For example, Canada has armed Israel for decades despite its longstanding illegal occupation, the ongoing crime of apartheid, and a pattern of collective punishment of Palestinians that predates the genocidal ethnic cleansing of Gaza taking place since October 7, 2023. These are all serious breaches of international law and should have been grounds for prohibiting arms transfers to Israel. Canada instead ignored them with both its direct and indirect transfers of weapons.

The U.S. Loophole: A Regulatory Black Hole

The intention of the ATT is that all weapons exports are supposed to fall under a country's arms control system. Unfortunately, **Canada has purposefully created a legal loophole for weapons sent through the U.S. to bypass the standard regulation required by EIPA and the ATT.** This is accomplished by explicitly exempting the majority of U.S.-bound military exports from requiring export permitting. Since most arms exports from Canada to the U.S.

¹⁴² [SPECIAL REPORT: "No Credible Evidence" – Canada's flawed analysis of arms exports to Saudi Arabia](#), Amnesty International Canada & Project Ploughshares, 11 August 2021.

do not require a permit from GAC, these weapons are neither regulated nor tracked. Thus, they escape the required human rights risk assessment concerning their end use and avoid the required scrutiny over whether there is an extreme risk of diversion. This situation is a regulatory blackhole of Canada's own making. It is outsourcing our obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty to the U.S. – which is not even a signatory to the treaty.

The U.S. Loophole is primarily created by article 2(a) of the Export Control List (ECL), an extremely important regulation that excludes most arms going to the U.S. from the laws of EIPA and thus from requiring an export permit. While this loophole does not apply to all weaponry exported to the U.S., GAC has issued a general export permit that eliminates the need to file individual permits for many of those exempted goods,¹⁴³ thus widening the loophole even further.

Given the complete lack of transparency from GAC, it is unclear whether GAC indeed issued permits for explosives to be sent to the U.S. facilities that manufacture Israel's bombs, or if regulatory loopholes have allowed GAC to recuse itself from regulating the explosive materials exported to the U.S. factories. Regardless, these shipments stand in direct opposition to their many claims to not allow Canadian arms to be used in Gaza.

The Scale of Unregulated Transfers

The data sets analyzed for this report suggest a significant gap between permitted and unpermitted exports to the U.S. In terms of the permitted goods sent to the U.S. in 2024, there were 79 permits used for a total value of goods of over \$170 million CAD by Canada-based arms companies. However, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED)'s trade tables show a total export of arms for the year 2024 to the U.S. of over \$318 million CAD from the arms and ammunition category Hs 93.¹⁴⁴ This suggests that at least \$148 million CAD worth of military goods in this category alone are transferred to the U.S. without permits. This likely does not include dual-use items outside trade category Hs 93.

This U.S. Loophole may amount to more than the size of all of Canada's other arms and ammunition exports, as ISED's trade tables total the value of Hs 93 arms exported to all other countries as almost \$151 Million CAD for 2024. When dual-use items are included, **this exemption for U.S.-destined arms may allow billions of dollars worth of Canadian-produced military components to be integrated into the U.S. military supply chain every year without oversight or transparency, circumventing Canada's legal obligations for human rights due diligence.**

Further, a significant portion of Canada's arms trade with the U.S. is brokered by the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), the entity that implements the Defence Production Sharing Agreement.¹⁴⁵ If the weapons being sold on contract to the U.S. Department of Defense are not

¹⁴³ [General Export Permit No. 47 – Export of Arms Trade Treaty Items to the United States](#), Government of Canada, (as of November 2025).

¹⁴⁴ [Report - Trade Data Online](#), Statistics Canada, 19 August 2025.

¹⁴⁵ [About DPSA](#), Canadian Commercial Corporation, (as of November 2025).

covered by an export permit from GAC, then the CCC is not necessarily required to implement the ATT, and its human rights assessments are not heavily scrutinized by Parliament or reported on by GAC.¹⁴⁶ This lack of transparency makes the unregulated contracts of the CCC an area of particularly high risk.

The Consequences: A Lack of Accountability

The practical consequence of this nexus of loopholes, omissions, and exemptions of sufficient arms control for sales to the U.S., and missing articles from the ATT, is that once these military goods enter the U.S., they are effectively untraceable and uncontrollable from the standpoint of the Canadian government. It appears as if it is no concern to GAC whether these arms remain in the U.S. strategic stockpile, are used to blow up drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean, or are shipped to Israel for use in Gaza.

Ultimately, the Canadian government has attempted to distance itself from the final use of these dangerous exports, thereby absolving itself of responsibility for any subsequent human rights violations – whether the current genocide or Israel’s longstanding crimes of apartheid in the illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. Consequently, this appears to amount to a strategy of purposeful negligence to avoid legal responsibility for these arms exports, while also avoiding expending the political capital required to justify arming a genocide in the first place.

As an Arms Trade Treaty signatory, Canada must prevent transfers where there is substantial risk of use in genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. By deliberately exempting U.S.-bound weapons from the required export regulations and allowing Canadian infrastructure to serve as a trade corridor for weapons, Canada circumvents these obligations. The International Court of Justice found plausible evidence of genocide in Gaza and recommended that all third party states cease the transfer of arms to Israel. Despite these provisional orders from the ICJ, Canada continued producing and shipping of F-35 components, exporting of explosives, and facilitating the transit of TNT, thus directly enabling Israel’s genocide.

Policy Recommendations

The Canadian Government must immediately end our military trade relationship with Israel until Israel ends its illegal occupation, apartheid system, and genocide against Palestinians, to ensure that Canada is neither complicit in Israel’s aggression, nor inadvertently funding Israel’s military-industrial complex. To achieve these important policy goals and legal obligations under international law, Canada must take the following steps:

¹⁴⁶ [The Canadian Commercial Corporation: Not yet a protector of human rights](#), Project Ploughshares, 28 September 2020.

1. A Comprehensive Two-Way Arms Embargo through Economic Sanctions:

- a. The Minister of Foreign Affairs using Canada's Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), our unilateral sanction legislation, can urgently **impose a comprehensive two-way arms embargo on Israel that bans Canadian arms from directly or indirectly reaching Israel** and also impose penalties for violations.

2. Amending and Using Canada's Arms Control Regime and Associated Legislation and Regulations:

- a. Export and Import Permits Act
 - ii. The Minister of Foreign Affairs can **suspend and/or cancel all export permits** for transfers of arms, parts, and components to Israel to end the flow of any arms sent directly to Israel used to facilitate or commit war crimes against Palestinians.
 - iii. The Minister of Foreign Affairs may amend EIPA to end indirect transfers of arms to Israel through the United States, thereby banning Canadian arms from being sent as military aid to Israel or being sold by the U.S. to Israel. **The Minister can do this by sponsoring MP Jenny Kwan's Private Member's Bill C-233, the No More Loopholes Act, as government legislation in the House.**
- b. Treasury Board Procurement Policy and Legislation
 - i. The Minister of Defence and the Defence Procurement Secretary of State **canceling all contracts and planned purchases** of military goods from Israel.
 - ii. The Minister of Government Transformation, Public Works and Procurement updating Canada's Procurement Code of Conduct and all associated materials to include measures that **prevent the purchase of arms** from companies involved in Israel's illegal occupation, apartheid system, and genocide in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Enacting these policy changes would finally end Canada's role in arming Israel's war crimes, and effectively cut off Canada's supply of F-35 parts and explosive materials to Israel, whether through the export of jet or bomb components to U.S. factories en route to Israel or through direct exports to Israel.

Conclusion

The shipments uncovered in this report are evidence of the Canadian government's broken promises and enduring failure to cut off the flow of Canadian arms to Israel.

Since the beginning of this genocide in Gaza, the Canadian government has attempted to pacify outrage by downplaying the flow of Canadian-made military goods to Israel with a series of shifting obfuscations.¹⁴⁷ See **Appendix** for detailed examples of government communications.

¹⁴⁷ ['A Pattern of Government Lies', p 24](#), Arms Embargo Now, 29 July 2025.

Most recently, confronted with evidence that Canada's shipments of arms to Israel had indeed continued through 2024 and 2025,¹⁴⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs Anita Anand doubled down on a particular strand of government misinformation: the claim that Canadian military exports to Israel were somehow not being used in Gaza. Anand reassured the public that the Canadian government would "not allow Canadian-made weapons to fuel this conflict in any way," claiming that they were cutting off permits for any arms that "could be used in Gaza."

The evidence presented in this report provides irrefutable proof that Canadian-made weapon components do continue to "fuel this conflict": Canadian companies' ongoing shipment of parts used in the production and maintenance of Israel's F-35s and the key explosives used by the Israeli military demonstrate that Canadian arms are undeniably being used in Gaza – including in some of Israel's most horrific acts of violence.

While Anand emphasized the government's pause in issuing permits, the vast majority of Canadian arms exports that end up in Israel do not require a permit at all – because of the U.S. Loophole that lets them travel, unregulated and untracked, through the U.S. first. Former Minister Mélanie Joly promised over a year ago that Canada wouldn't allow any arms to be sent to Gaza, regardless of "how they're being sent and where they're being sent" – but the massive flow of Canadian military exports to Israel via the U.S. has remained uninterrupted.

This report provides a snapshot of how this U.S. Loophole functions by tracking some of the ongoing exports of F-35 parts and explosives from and through Canada to the U.S. and then on to Israel, either as standalone parts or assembled into full systems.

The passage of Canadian military components through the U.S. Loophole en route to Israel allows them to bypass Canadian export controls; the incorporation of these components into the F-35s and notorious 2000lb bombs used by Israel makes their use in Gaza unequivocal. **Both Israel's F-35 fighter jets and the bombs they are dropping on Gaza rely on an ongoing flow of parts from Canadian factories and through Canadian ports.**

The time for government excuses has ended. The evidence is clear. Canada remains an active participant in genocide. To end this complicity, Canada must close the loopholes in its arms export regulations and enact sanctions to cut off the flow of weapons to and from Israel. **Canada must impose an arms embargo now.**

¹⁴⁸ [Exposing Canadian Military Exports to Israel](#), Arms Embargo Now, 29 July 2025.

Appendix: Government of Canada statements on the Canada-Israel arms trade, 2023-2025

PHASE 1 - Complete Denial (December 2023-January 2024)			
When	Who	What	Fact Check
Dec 6 2023	Global Affairs Canada (GAC) Assistant Deputy Minister Alexandre Lévesque	"To his knowledge, there had been no arms export and brokering permits issued for Israel since October 7, and that no Canadian military goods or technology, "including components," are being used by Israel in its brutal war on Gaza." (source , source)	<i>False.</i> New arms export permits were issued until January 8, 2024, at which point the government paused new approvals, but continued to allow arms to be shipped out under previously approved permits . Most of these were components of larger military systems.
Dec 19 2023	GAC spokesperson Jean-Pierre J. Godbout	"Global Affairs Canada has not issued any permit for full weapon systems listed by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to Israel since October 7, 2023." (source)	<i>Irrelevant.</i> Canada largely does not produce full weapon systems for export to Israel. Canadian companies primarily produce technical components that are incorporated into "full weapons systems" either in Israel, or in the U.S. and then sent on to Israel . The same spokesperson said in a later statement that "Canada has not received any requests, and therefore not issued any permits, for full weapon systems for major conventional arms or light weapons to Israel for over 30 years."
Jan 31 2024	PM Justin Trudeau	"We have not issued permits since Oct. 7." (source)	<i>False.</i> Between October 7, 2023 and January 8, 2024, Canada issued a record breaking number of military export permits to Israel. Data from Global Affairs Canada revealed nearly \$30 million dollars worth of new export permits for military goods and technology had been authorized to Israel in just the first the two months of the genocide.

PHASE 2 - "Non-Lethal" Fiction (January-March 2024)

When	Who	What	Fact Check
Jan 30 2024	Global Affairs Canada	"The permits which <i>have been granted since October 7, 2023, are for the export of non-lethal equipment.</i> "	<i>Obfuscation.</i> This was the first confirmation that Canada had indeed issued new military export permits since the genocide began. This was also the introduction of the idea of 'non-lethal,' exports, a category fabricated in government statements and with no meaning according to domestic or international law. (source)
Feb 7 2024	Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly	"What I can tell you is that there have been no weapons sent under my watch in recent years, and none since October 7... We have sent, since 7 October, non-lethal equipment , including night vision goggles and protective gear." (source)	<i>Obfuscation.</i> In winter 2024, Canadian officials doubled down on their invented "non-lethal" designation. But the 'protective gear' example cited by Joly is a distraction from many indisputably lethal exports – such as the \$2 million of "accessories related to bombs and other explosives" detailed in the recently leaked 2024 Parliamentary Report or many of the shipments detailed in the commercial shipping records or Israeli Tax Authority data .
March 18 2024	GAC statement	"Since Jan. 8, the government has not approved new arms export permits to Israel and this will continue until we can ensure full compliance with our export regime, " the department said in a statement. Export permits issued before Jan. 8 are still in effect. "Given the nature of the supply chain, suspending all open permits would have important implications for both Canada and its allies," said the statement." (source)	<i>Accurate.</i> While a welcome step in the right direction, this pause in new permits did not impact the existing export permits – including the record breaking surge in permit approvals in late 2023. These arms continued to be shipped to Israel – as the dated commercial shipment data demonstrates – throughout 2024 and 2025.
March 18 2024	Non-binding motion passed in Parliament (approved by Trudeau and entire cabinet)	Canada would " cease the further authorization and transfer of arms exports to Israel to ensure compliance with Canada's arms export regime." (source)	<i>Obfuscation.</i> Although the word "transfer" is in the text of the motion that Joly committed to follow, she and GAC immediately clarified that existing permits would not be touched and thus ongoing transfers would continue (source). The government's action in response to this motion was essentially to formalize the Jan 8th new permit pause, and posture as if the "transfer of arms exports" had also ceased.
March 18 2024	Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly	"This is clearly the intent of the government to make sure that we follow what is written in this motion. And that is why we worked very hard to get to a text where we could abide by it." (source)	

July 18 2024	Prime Minister Justin Trudeau	“We’ve stopped exports of arms to Israel” (source)	<i>False.</i>
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Phase 3 – Restrictions That Cannot Be Monitored (August 2024–present)

When	Who	What	Fact Check
Sep 10 2024	Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly	“We will not have any form of arms or parts of arms be sent to Gaza, period. How they’re being sent and where they’re being sent is irrelevant. And so therefore my position is clear, the position of the government is clear, and we’re in contact with General Dynamics.” (source)	<i>Insufficient.</i> Joly purportedly stopped one U.S.-bound ammunition sale destined for Israel (due to outrage from civil society after the planned General Dynamics shipment was made public) and paused 30 (or approx 12%) of the 200+ permits that had been issued prior to the Jan 8 pause and were still active in fall 2024 (source). While both were welcome steps in the right direction, they were a drop in the bucket of the wider flow of arms – and only confirmed that previously approved direct permits and indirect exports through the US had indeed continued, despite the ‘pause’. <i>False.</i> Saying “How they’re being sent and where they’re being sent is irrelevant” indicates wider action to close the U.S. loophole – which allows Canadian weapons to reach Israel via the US. But no action was taken beyond this one shipment – indeed, U.S. DOD records revealed in March 2025 another contract for GD-OTS goods en route to Israel, this time for \$78.8 million in artillery propellants (source).
Oct 4 2024	Bob Rae, UN Ambassador	“We have to say ‘no, we’re gonna make sure that we will support Israel’s defensive needs , but we will limit other particular kinds of exports.’” (source)	<i>Obfuscation.</i> This new “defensive exemption,” buried in a National Post interview rather than laid out in an official GAC update, is without any parameters, criteria, or monitoring, and requires trusting Netanyahu’s war cabinet to make responsible choices with their military imports.
March 4 2025	GAC Spokesperson	“Since January 8th, 2024, the Government of Canada has not approved new arms export permits to Israel , and this remains the Government’s approach.” (source)	<i>False.</i> “Data from Global Affairs Canada (GAC) shows that in February 2025 the Liberal government authorized two new military export permits to Israel worth a combined total of \$37.2 million. GAC insists it has not authorized any new export permits for goods that it believes could be used in Gaza, but won’t answer questions about whether or not this policy applies to Israel’s military operations in other regions.” (source)

April 8 2025	Prime Minister Mark Carney	"That's why we have an arms embargo " (source)	<i>False.</i> An "arms embargo" is defined by the Canadian government as a type of sanction to "prohibit exporting and importing arms and related materials to and from the targeted country." It can be imposed through the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA) – as it has been on other listed countries including Russia, Iran, and North Korea – but it has not been imposed on Israel.
April 9 2025	Prime Minister Mark Carney	"Canada does ... have restrictions, probably from January 2024, on arms exports, or permits for arms exports to Israel with the sole exception of the Iron Dome which protects them more broadly. " (source)	<i>Obfuscation.</i> Perhaps the first time that the Iron Dome exemption was introduced. (The Maple followed up with GAC at the time to confirm if this was true. The department said it has "nothing further to add to Prime Minister Carney's comments."). This new excuse is flawed for several reasons – both because of longstanding critiques of the Iron Dome itself, which "cannot meaningfully be considered "life-saving" in any value system that recognizes Palestinian humanity" (source), and because it is virtually impossible to control or monitor where the diversity of Canadian-made military components end up once they reach Israel.
Aug 2 2025	Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand	"Since January 2024, we have refused any new permits for controlled goods that could be used in Gaza. Not one has been approved. "We went further by freezing all existing permits in 2024 that could have allowed military components to be used in Gaza, and those permits remain suspended today. "The law is clear: no company may export controlled goods without a valid permit. We will not hesitate to ensure that those who violate this law face legal consequences that include fines, seizures and criminal prosecution. "In other words, we will not allow Canadian-made weapons to fuel this conflict in any way."	<i>Obfuscation.</i> That Canadian arms shipped to Israel will "not be used in Gaza" is impossible to monitor or control. "Chris Cobb-Smith, a former British Army officer and war crimes investigator, told The Maple in an email: "Generally, I don't believe it is possible to differentiate between weapon systems, munitions and component with regard to where they are going to be eventually used, and it would be impossible to verify anyway.'" GAC has never clarified their criteria (can Canadian parts be used to bomb Lebanon? What about to surveil the occupied West Bank?) nor demonstrated any process by which it might verify where Canadian-made munitions exported to Israel are used.

Aug 4 2025	Minister Anand's office via GAC statement to CTV	"For a year and a half, we have been clear: if an export permit for an item used to protect civilians is requested, it will be approved."	Obfuscation. Far from "clear", this is perhaps the first time this language has been used to describe official exceptions to the pause in new arms exports. The use case of military goods sent to Israel, much like the use location, is impossible for Canada to track, verify, or control. Are Canadian officials taking Netanyahu's war cabinet, wanted for war crimes by the ICC, at their word when they say that their requested F-35 parts are intended to "defend civilians"? Israeli government officials and cabinet ministers have been making explicitly genocidal statements condoning mass murder and ethnic cleansing in Gaza for two years – often couched in a language of 'self defence'. Which civilians are Anand's arms exports protecting?
August 10 2025	James Fitz-Morris, spokesperson for Anita Anand	"The government's position has not changed. Minister Anand is not reading from a script. She uses different words sometimes to convey the same message or to add clarity, depending on the circumstances and what she is responding to." "The only permits that may be granted are for the items used to defend civilians, such as the Iron Dome, and items that are transiting through Israel as part of the global supply chain such as items (whose) end-users include Canada and/or NATO allies." (Source)	<i>False.</i> Anyone who has been following the government's shifting and contradictory statements knows that their position has meandered endlessly. While some permits may indeed be incorporated in the Iron Dome or intended to be repaired and shipped elsewhere, this does not begin to cover the hundreds of exports that have continued to flow from Canada to Israel.

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ARMS EMBARGO NOW

Arms Embargo Now is a coalitional campaign bringing together hundreds of organizations across Canada to end the flow of all weapons to and from Israel

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The **Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM)** is a transnational, independent, grassroots movement of Palestinian and Arab youth struggling for the liberation of our homeland

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CJPME's mission is to enable Canadians of all backgrounds to promote justice, development and peace in the Middle East, and here at home in Canada.

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World Beyond War is a global nonviolent movement to end war and establish a just and sustainable peace.

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